Arbogast Family Trust, by and through Rodney J. Arbogast as Trustee v. River Crossings, LLC, a Nevada Limted Liability Company : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2007
Arbogast Family Trust, by and through Rodney J.
Arbogast as Trustee v. River Crossings, LLC, a
Nevada Limted Liability Company : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Chad J. Utley; Tyler T. Todd; Farris & Utley, P.C.; Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee.
Scott M. Lilja; Nicole M. Deforge; Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy; Attorneys for
Defendant/Appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Arbogast v. River Crossings, No. 20070395 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2007).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/244
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ARBOGAST FAMILY TRUST, by and 
through RODNEY J. ARBOGAST as 
TRUSTEE, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
RIVER CROSSING, LLC, a Nevada 
Limited Liability Company, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Appellate No: 20070395-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
On Appeal from the Fifth Judicial District Court, in and for Washington County, Utah 
District Court Civil No. 06050Q096 
Scott L. Lilja 
Nicole M. Deforge 
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
CtiadJ.Utley,#7654 
ler T.Todd, #10691 
Fajris & Utley, P.C. 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
W. Sunset Blvd., 2nd Floor 
Box 2408 
George, UT 84771-2408 
ephone: (435) 634-1600 
2107 
P. 
St.l 
Tel 
0. 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COi 
NOV G 1 2007 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iv 
JURISDICTION STATEMENT 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 1 
I. FIRST ISSUE 1 
II. SECOND ISSUE
 4 1 
III. THIRD ISSUE 2 
IV. FOURTH ISSUE 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 3 
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 4 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 6 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 14 
ARGUMENT 15 
I. THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO HEAR ISSUES ON APPEAL 
REGARDING JURISDICTION AND NOTICE UNDER RULES 5 AND 
55 OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 15 
II. A PARTY MUST FIRST RAISE THE ISSUE IN THE TRIAL COURT TO 
ALLOW THE TRIAL COURT TO RULE ON THE ISSUE IN ORDER TO 
PROPERLY RESERVE THE ISSUE FOR APPELLATE REVIEW 17 
A. River Crossings' argument that the default judgment should be set 
aside for lack of notice under Rule 5(a)(2)(B) should not be heard by 
this Court as it was not raised at the District Court level 17 
III. EVEN IF THE ISSUE OF NOTICE IS TO BE CONSIDERED ON THIS 
APPEAL, RIVER CROSSINGS FAILED TO FORMALLY APPEAR SO 
AS TO NOT REQUIRE ARBOGAST TO PROVIDE NOTICE OF 
DEFAULT TO RIVER CROSSINGS PURSUANT TO RULE 5(a)(2)(B) 
OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 20 
A. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding that River 
Crossings failed to formally appear 20 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT'S REFUSAL TO SET ASIDE THE FINDINGS 
OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER DENYING RELIEF 
FROM JUDGMENT AND ORDERS WAS NOT IN ERROR 23 
V. EVEN IF RIVER CROSSING DID APPEAR, THE NOTIFICATION 
SENT BY ARBOGAST THROUGH THE JUNE 29,2006 LETTER WAS 
SUFFICIENT UNDER THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 25 
A. Although the District Court found some level of participation by 
River Crossings sufficient so as to constitute an appearance, the 
District Court was correct in finding that Arbogast had provided 
adequate notice to River Crossings 25 
VI. RIVER CROSSINGS FAILED TO SUFFICIENTLY PROVE 
EXCUSABLE NEGLECT FOR ITS FAILURE TO TIMELY FILE AN 
ANSWER TO THE COMPLAINT 28 
A. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying River 
Crossings' Motion for Relief from Judgment and Orders 28 
B. River Crossings' actions do not fall within the definition of "due 
diligence." 29 
C. River Crossings should not be provided relief under Rule 60(b)(3) as 
Arbogast's counsel provided River Crossings' Nevada counsel with 
advance written notice prior to filing the Default Judgment 33 
D. Rule 60(b)(6) does not apply to the relief sought here as River 
Crossings is seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(1) 34 
E. River Crossings meritorious defenses should not be considered as 
River Crossings has failed to show excusable neglect or provide any 
other reason justifying relief 36 
VII. THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING TO NOT SET ASIDE THE 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED AS THE FINDINGS 
OF FACT WERE NOT FAULTY 37 
-ii-
A. Based on the evidence marshaled by River Crossings, the District 
Court's finding that there were no communications between the 
parties from June 29, 2006 to August 18, 2006 was not clearly 
erroneous i 38 
B. The District Court's finding that Arbogast "required" River 
Crossings to file a responsive pleading was n6t clearly erroneous.. 39 
VIII. ATTORNEY'S FEES 41 
CONCLUSION , 42 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
 4 44 
Addenda 
A. Determinative Rules. 
B. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Defying Defendant's Motion for 
Relief From Judgment and Orders. 
C. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant's Rule 60(b) Motion 
for Relief from Judgement and Orders. 
D. Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Rule d0(b) Motion For Relief from 
Judgment and Orders. 
E. Reply to Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendant's Rule,60(b) Motion for Relief From 
Judgment and Orders. 
F. June 29, 2006 Letter 
-in-
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Statutes and Rules 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) 1 
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) passim 
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3) 33 
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) 35 
UtahR. Civ. P. 5(a)(2) passim 
Utah R. Civ. P. 5(a)(2)(B) 17,20 
UtahR. Civ. P. 55(b)(1)(A) 19,20,21 
UtahR. App. P. 4(a) 15,16,17 
UtahR. App. P. 24(a)(9) 41 
Cases 
Airkem Intermountain. Inc v. Parker. 513 P.2d429,431 (Utah 1973) 25,30 
Black's Title Inc. v. State Ins. Dept.. 991 P.2d 607 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) 24,29,33 
34,35 
Board of Education of Granite School District v. Cox. 384 P.2d 806 (Utah 
1963) 36 
Central Bank & Trust v. Jensen. 656 P.2d 1009.1011 (Utah 1982) 22 
Chenv. Stewart.2005 UT68.^ 1 n.l. 123 P.3d416 1,2,37 
Covev v.Covev. 2003 UT App 3801.19.80 P.3d 553 2 
Foote v. Clark. 962 P.2d 52.54 (Utah 1998) 41 
Franklin Covey Client Sales. Inc. v. Melvin. 2000 UT App 110, U 19, 2 P.3d 
451 17 
Harris v. IES Assocs.. 2003 UT App 112. p 2 , 6 9 P.3d 297 39 
Jouflas v. Fox Television Stations. Inc.. 927 P.2d 170.174 (Utah 1996) 3,38 
-iv-
Katz v. Pierce. 732 P.2d 92.93 (Utah 1986) 24,37 
Lincoln Benefit Life Ins. Co v. D.T. Southern Properties. 838 P. 2d 672, 674 
(Utah App. 1992) 35 
Lord v. Lord. 709 P.2d338.339n.l (Utah 1985) 16 
Lund v. Brown. 2000 UT 75.19.11 P.3d 277 passim 
Menziesv.Galetka.2006UT81.H3,150P.3d480 3,33,38 
Mini Spas. Inc. v. Industrial Commission. 733 P.2d 130,132 (Utah 1987) 24,29 
Myers v.Interwest Corp.. 632 P.2d 879 (Utah 1981) 23 
Olsen v. Bd. of Educ. of Granite Sch. Dist. 571 P.2d 1336.1338 (Utah 1977). 15 
Ostler v. Buhler. 1999 UT 99.1f 5.989 P.2d 1073 2 
Serrato v. Utah Transit Auth.. 13 P.3d 616, cert, denied. 21 P.3d 218 (Utah 
2001) 15 
State v.Holeate. 2000 UT 7441L 10 P-3d 346 18 
State v. Todd. 2004 UT App 266.98 P.3d46 15 
State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) , 18 
State v.Musselman. 667P.2d 1053 (Utah 1983) 36 
State v. Richins. 2004 UT App 36.18.86 P.3d 759 18 
State v.Viiil. 784 P.2d 1130 (Utah 1989) 23 
UtahPept. of Soc. Servs. v. Adams. 806 P.2d 1193.1197 (UtahCt. App. 1991) 41 
Varian-Eimac. Inc. v. Lamoreaux. 767 P.2d 569.570 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 15,17,19 
20 
-V-
JURISDICTION STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to UCA §78-
2a-3(2)(j) (2007). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Plaintiff/Appellee (hereinafter sometimes referred to as "Arbogast") disagrees with 
the Issue Presented for Review and Statement of the Case presented by 
Defendant/Appellant (hereinafter sometimes referred to as "River Crossings"). Arbogast 
sets forth the following characterization of the issues on this appeal for this Appellate 
Court's consideration. 
1. First Issue. Whether River Crossings formally appeared in the District Court case 
so as to require Arbogast to provide notice of default to River Crossings pursuant to Rule 
5(a)(2)(B) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Standard of Review. This issue presents a question of fact. A district court's 
findings of fact are reviewed under a clear error standard of review. Chen v. Stewart, 
2005 UT 68, Tf 1 n.l, 123 P.3d 416. 
2. Second Issue. If River Crossings did appear, whether the notification sent 
by Arbogast through the June 29, 2006 letter was sufficient under the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure to constitute notice to River Crossings of default proceedings. 
Standard of Review. This issue presents a question of law. "The trial court's 
interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question of law, which we review for 
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correctness." Ostler v. Buhler, 1999 UT 99, f 5, 989 P.2d 1073. In addition, when a 
district court is required to determine whether a given set of facts comes within the reach 
of a given rule of law, "we [still] review legal questions for dorrectness, [but] we may . . . 
grant a trial court discretion in its application of the law to a given fact situation." Covey 
v. Covey, 2003 UT App 380 % 19, 80 P.3d 553. 
3. Third Issue. Whether River Crossings failure to timely respond to 
Arbogast's Complaint for Declaratory Judgment was excusable neglect, inadvertence, or 
mistake, so as to suggest the District Court abused its discretion in denying River 
Crossings Motion for Relief from Judgment and Orders. 
Standard of Review. A district court has broad discretion to rule on a motion to 
set aside a default judgment under rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, 
a district court's denial of a 60(b) motion is reviewed under an abuse of discretion 
standard of review. See Lund v. Brown. 2000 UT 75, % 9, 11 P.3d 277. 
4. Forth Issue. Whether the District Court based its decision on adequate 
findings of fact and the law. 
Standard of Review. A district court's ruling on a motion to set aside a default 
judgment "must be based on adequate findings of fact and on the law." (Id. ^ 9). As 
such, a district court's findings of fact are reviewed under a clear error standard of 
review. Chen v. Stewart. 2005 UT 68, f 1 n.l, 123 P.3d 416. However, "in order to 
challenge a court's factual findings, [River Crossings] must first marshal all the evidence 
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in support of the finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to 
support the finding even when viewing it in a light most favorable to the court below." 
(Id.) "A finding of fact may be deemed 'clearly erroneous' only if the finding is without 
factual support in the record ... or if the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with 
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." See Jouflas v. Fox 
Television Stations, Inc., 927 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah 1996). Moreover, the Appellate Court 
should look only to those facts that were crucial to the district court's decision. See 
Menzies v. Galetka. 2006 UT 81,1f 3, 150 P.3d 480. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
River Crossings appeals the District Court's denial its Motion for Relief from 
Judgment and Orders. River Crossings alleges that the District Court improperly refused 
lo set aside the default judgment entered against it despite the alleged fact that Arbogast 
failed to provide River Crossings with notice of the default proceedings and despite the 
alleged fact that River Crossings provided sufficient evidence of reasonable justification 
for its failure to answer Arbogast's Complaint for Declaratory Judgment ("Complaint"). 
These allegations simply are not true. 
River Crossings had been granted two (2) separate extensions of time in which to 
file an Answer to the Complaint. Both extensions had expired, settlement negotiations 
were terminated and advanced written notice was given to River Crossings that an 
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Answer to the Complaint was due within twenty (20) days of the June 29, 2006 letter. To 
suggest that Arbogast "quietly obtained a default judgment" against River Crossings is 
misleading, is against the clear weight of the evidence and is alleged in bad faith. River 
Crossings fails to marshal any evidence suggesting the District Court abused its discretion 
in refusing to set aside the default judgment. 
II. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Belo|v 
On January 10, 2006, Arbogast filed a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment (Civil 
No. 06050096) in the Fifth Judicial District Court. Arbogast's cause of action, or claim, 
was to enforce a Late Payment Penalty that was due and owing by River Crossings to 
Arbogast for failure to timely make the Final Payment due under the express terms of the 
Trust Deed Note. Numerous attempts to serve River Crossings with Arbogast's 
Complaint failed. Nevertheless, service was finally realized upon River Crossings, 
through counsel, on or about April 4, 2006. 
Upon being served with the Complaint, River Crossings' counsel, Aileen E. 
Cohen, sent a letter to Arbogast's counsel, Chad J. Utley, rdquesting an extension of time 
in which to respond to the Complaint for the purposes of negotiating a settlement. This 
first extension of time was granted and was set to expire on May 29, 2006. Then, on June 
5, 2006, River Crossings asked for a second extension of time. This second extension of 
time was granted and was set to expire on June 14, 2006. 
On June 16, 2006, two (2) days after a second extension of time had expired, River 
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Crossings counsel, Tisha Black-Chernine and Josh Corelli, contacted Mr. Utley. Counsel 
discussed the issue of the Answer to the Complaint being due. Counsel for both parties 
recognize that a statement may have been made that notice would be provided to River 
Crossings prior to Arbogast initiating default proceedings. As such, on June 28, 2006, 
without having initiated default proceedings, Mr. Utley received a telephone call from 
River Crossings' counsel wherein a settlement offer was made. 
On June 29, 2006, after communicating the settlement offer to his client, after 
granting two (2) extensions of time to River Crossings to file an answer to the Complaint 
and after failing to reach a settlement agreement, Mr. Utley sent a letter ("June 29, 2006 
Letter") to River Crossings' counsel rejecting the settlement offer and requesting that 
River Crossings file an Answer to the Complaint within twenty (20) days from the date of 
the letter. 
On July 31, 2006, twelve (12) days after the answer was due pursuant to the June 
29, 2006 Letter and after receiving no communication whatsoever from River Crossings, 
Arbogast filed a Default Certificate. On August 11, 2006, Arbogast filed a Default 
Judgment against River Crossings in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
On August 17, 2006, in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Arbogast sent 
a Notice of Entry of Default Judgment to River Crossings. 
Subsequently, on September 26, 2006, River Crossings filed a Motion for Relief 
from Judgment and Orders alleging: (1) mistake, surprise, excusable neglect, 
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misrepresentation, fraud or any other reason justifying relief under Rule 60(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2) meritorious defenses. On February 21, 2007, a hearing 
regarding River Crossings' Motion for Relief from Judgment and Order was held before 
the District Court. On April 18, 2007, the District Court issued its Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order Denying Defendant's Motion for Relief from Judgment 
and Orders. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. On September 16, 2004, Plaintiff/Appellee Arbogast Family Trust ("Arbogast") 
extended Defendant/Appellant River Crossings, LLC ("River Crossings") a loan in 
the amount of two million four hundred fifty thousand dollars ($2,450,000.00) 
(hereinafter "Loan") which was secured by a Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note. (R. 
at 11611). 
2. The Trust Deed Note provided a schedule of payments as follows: River Crossings 
was to pay Arbogast the sum of eighteen thousand three hundred seventy-five 
dollars ($18,375.00) monthly, interest only, beginning on October 16, 2004, and a 
like sum of eighteen thousand three hundred seventy-five dollars ($18,375.00) 
monthly on the 16th day of each and every month thereafter until the 16th day of 
September, 2005. (R. at 116 f4, 82). 
3. Pursuant to express terms of the Trust Deed Note, any remaining unpaid balance, 
along with accrued interest, was due and payable on September 16, 2005 
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(hereinafter "Maturity Date"). (R. at 116 f3). 
On the Maturity Date, the entire remaining unpaid balance, together with interest 
accrued thereon, (hereinafter "Final Payment") was immediately due and payable. 
(R. at 82). 
On September 16, 2005, when the Final Payment, became due and payable, River 
Crossings was unable and/or failed to tender the Final Payment. (R. at 116 |6). 
The Trust Deed Note, expressly provided a penalty for late payment (hereinafter 
"Late Payment Penalty") as follows: 
"A late payment penalty of six percent (6%) if any payments shall be 
assessed against the maker if said payment has not been received by Holder 
(Plaintiff) within five (5) days of the due date. Each payment shall be 
credited first to any late payments due, then to accrued interest due and the 
remainder to principal. Any such installment not paid when due shall bear 
interest thereafter at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum until paid." 
(R. at 117TJ8, 82). 
On October 7, 2005, twenty-one (21) days after the Final Payment was due, River 
Crossings made a payment to Arbogast, but River Crossings refused to pay the 
Late Payment Penalty. (R. at 116 f7). 
River Crossings disputed and refused to pay the Late Payment Penalty based on its 
allegations that Arbogast had granted it an extension for the due date of the Final 
Payment. (R. at 1171J9, 58 at f4). 
In addition, River Crossings challenges the enforceability of the Late Payment 
Penalty. (R. at 58 Tf4). Arbogast alleges an extension for Final Payment was not 
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granted and that the Late Payment Penalty provision is enforceable. (R. at 4 ^fl6). 
10. By October 7, 2005, the Late Payment Penalty had accrued to approximately one 
hundred seventy-eight thousand five hundred thirty-nine dollars ($178,539.31). 
(R. at 117110, 3 at 1(12). 
11. On or about October 6, 2005, pursuant to the Escrow Instructions/Holdback 
Agreement entered by the parties as a result of River (pressings' dispute over the 
Late Payment Penalty, a title company was authorized to withhold one hundred 
seventy-eight thousand five hundred thirty-nine dollars ($178,539.31) (hereinafter 
"Escrowed Funds") in escrow pending the resolution of the dispute. (R. at 117 f^ 
10, 3 at f 12). 
12. The Escrow Instructions/Holdback Agreement provided, in part, that the title 
company would disburse the funds in accordance with the parties' agreement, or if 
no agreement, then in accordance with a court order. (R. at 117 fl 1). 
13. Arbogast made several attempts to reach an agreement with River Crossings 
concerning the correct interpretation of the Late Payment Penalty, but the parties 
were unable to come to an agreement. (R. at 117 f I4). 
14. On January 10, 2006, Plaintiff filed its Complaint for Declaratory Judgment 
("Complaint") (Civil No. 06050096) in the Fifth Judicial District Court. (R. at 1). 
15. On or about December 20, 2005, Arbogast's legal counsel, Mr. Chad Utley of the 
law firm Farris & Utley, P.C., received a letter from Josh Corelli, on behalf of 
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Tisha Black-Chernine, informing Arbogast that River Crossings had retained the 
legal services of the Nevada law firm of Black, Lobello & Pitegoff. (R. at 118 
11(13,22,86). 
Arbogast attempted to serve River Crossings with the Complaint. However, 
despite diligent efforts to locate and serve River Crossings, Plaintiff was unable to 
effectuate service. Thereafter, Arbogast sought and obtained an Order of 
Alternative Service which granted permission to serve River Crossings' counsel. 
(R. at 118 114, 27). 
On April 4, 2006, Arbogast served River Crossings with the Complaint by serving 
the same upon River Crossings' Nevada counsel. (R. at 118 1|15, 31). 
Counsel for Arbogast granted River Crossings' Nevada counsel, Aileen E. Cohen 
of Black, Lobello & Pitegoff, two (2) separate extensions of time to file an answer 
to the Complaint for the purpose of engaging in settlement negotiations and/or to 
seek Utah counsel. (R. at 118 [^16, 92 at ffi[5, 88, 89). 
Upon each extension of time to file an answer granted to River Crossings, River 
Crossings' counsel Aileen E. Cohen would send a confirmation letter confirming 
the extension of time and the understanding between counsel. (R. at 88, 89). 
On June 14, 2006, the second extension of time granted by Arbogast to River 
Crossings to answer the Complaint expired. (R. at 118 f 17, 92 at f 7, 89). 
Sometime between June 14, 2006, and June 28, 2006, Arbogast, through Mr. 
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Utley, had contact with River Crossings' counsel, Tisha Black-Chernine and also 
with Josh Corelli, both of the law firm of Black, LoBello & Sparks. (R. at 119 
1fl8,92at1f8). 
22. On or about June 16, 2006, there was a telephone call between Mr. Utley, Tisha 
Black-Chernine and Josh Corelli wherein they discussed an answer to the 
Complaint was due. (R. at 185 at p. 7 f t6-1 0)-
23. There is a dispute as to whether Mr. Utley made a statement to Tisha Black-
Chernine and Josh Corelli that he would not file a default judgment without first 
providing notice and what such a statement, if said, actually means. (R. at 185 at p. 
711111-24). 
24. On or about June 28, 2006, Josh Corelli offered sum certain as settlement via the 
telephone to Mr. Utley. (R. at 119 at f 19). 
25. On June 29, 2006, Mr. Utley sent a letter (hereinafter "June 29, 2006 Letter") via 
facsimile transmission to River Crossing, addressed to Tisha Black-Chernine and 
to Josh Corelli, informing both of them that Arbogast had rejected the verbal 
settlement offer and was requesting River Crossing to file an Answer to the 
Complaint within twenty (20) days of the date of thef June 29, 2006 Letter. (R. at 
119atff20,91). 
26. The June 29, 2006 Letter effectively terminated settlement negotiations and served 
as notice to River Crossings to file an Answer to the Complaint. (R. at 185 at 21 
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HU18-21). 
27. Mr. Utley never received any confirmation letter nor any other letter or telephone 
call from counsel for River Crossings seeking any clarification of the meaning of 
the June 29, 2006 Letter. No additional time extensions to answer the Complaint 
were requested by River Crossings during the June 16, 2006 telephone 
conversation and no additional time extensions were granted to River Crossings 
during the telephone conversation on June 16, 2006. (R. at 119 atf21, 93, 185 at 
211f25, 185 at 22 Hfl-4). 
28. There were no other discussions between Arbogast's counsel and River Crossings 
counsel between June 29, 2006 and August 18, 2006. (R. at 119 at f22, 93). 
29. Pursuant to the June 29, 2006 Letter, an Answer to Arbogast's Complaint was to 
be filed within twenty (20) days of June 29, 2006. (R. at 119 at U 23, 91, 185 at 21 
11118-24). 
30. Arbogast's counsel waited beyond the twenty (20) days prescribed by the June 29, 
2006 Letter (thirty two (32) calendar days) prior to filing the Default Certificate 
with the District Court. (R. at 119 at Tf24, 32). 
31. River Crossings never filed a formal appearance of record in the District Court 
case. (Civil No. 06050096) (R. at 120 at f29). 
32. The District Court, in the alternative, did find that River Crossings had informally 
appeared in the action pending before in the District Court (Civil No. 06050096). 
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(R. at 120 at f29). 
33. Based on River Crossings' informal appearance, the District Court found that the 
June 29, 2006 Letter served as adequate written notice to River Crossings. (R. at 
120 at Tf29). 
34. On July 31, 2006, having not received any communication from River Crossings' 
counsel since June 28, 2006 and as a result of River Crossings failing to file an 
Answer in response to the Complaint, Arbogast filed a Default Certificate; of 
which was filed approximately four (4) months after Service of the Complaint upon 
River Crossings. (R. at 120 at ^ 25, 31, 185 at 21 f25, 185 at 22 ff 1-4). 
35. On August 11, 2006, a Default Judgment was entered of record in favor of 
Arbogast against River Crossings. (R. at 120 at f26, 35). 
36. On August 17, 2006, Notice of Entry of Default Judgment was filed with the Court 
and was sent by Arbogast to River Crossings. (R. at 37). 
37. The District Court found that River Crossings' notification and communications 
with Arbogast's counsel established an appearance sufficient enough to be 
provided notice of default proceedings. (R. at 120 at f29). 
38. The District Court found that River Crossings was provided adequate notice of the 
default proceedings by its receipt of the June 29, 2006 Letter. (R. at 120 at Tf29). 
39. The District Court found that the contention that Riyer Crossings' counsel 
expected notice prior to the entry of default was unfounded given the express 
12 
provisions of the June 29, 2006 Letter. (R. at 120 at p 0 ) . 
40. On or about August 18, 2006, Tisha Black-Chernine informed Mr. Utley through 
telephone that she was unaware of the June 29, 2006 Letter because she had been 
out of the office for an extended period of time. (R. at 71 at 1J24). 
41. At the time of the June 29, 2006 Letter, Tisha Black-Chernine was on extended 
vacation and was allegedly not made aware of the June 29, 2006 Letter. (R. at 96, 
185 at 119). 
42. The District Court found River Crossings failed to exercise due diligence by 
failing to follow up or otherwise communicate with Arbogast's Counsel after 
receiving the June 29, 2006 Letter and by failing to file an Answer after having 
been requested to do so after Arbogast provided River Crossings with advance 
written notice that the time for the two (2) extensions had expired and that the 
settlement offer had been rejected. (R. at 120 at 131). 
43. The District Court found that River Crossings' counsel's lack of due diligence 
resulted in River Crossings' failure to answer the Complaint within the allotted 
time. (R. at 121 at 132). 
44. On September 26, 2006, River Crossings filed its Motion for Relief from 
Judgment and Orders. (R. at 45). 
45. On April 18, 2007, the District Court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Order Denying Defendant's Rule 60(b) Motion. ( R. at 115). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The District Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of JLaw and Order Denying 
Defendant's Motion for Relief from Judgment and Orders (the "Order") should be 
affirmed on this apeal. River Crossings fails to provide sufficient evidence that suggests 
the District Court's Order was not based on adequate findings of fact, was not correct, 
was an abuse of discretion and/or was clearly erroneous. Inapposite to River Crossings 
allegations, the evidence provided to the District Court shows that Arbogast honored its 
agreement to not initiate default proceedings without first providing notice of the same. 
The evidence further provides that Arbogast did provide actual advance written notice to 
River Crossings that an Answer to the Complaint was due and that default would be 
imminent. 
River Crossings simply ignored the notice and failed to file a timely response to 
the Complaint. River Crossings has failed to provide sufficient evidence of reasonable 
justification for failing to file an answer to the Complaint. On appeal, River Crossings 
goes into great lengths to re-argue its Motion for Relief From Judgment and Order. 
However, a review of the record reflects that the District Court was able to sift through 
the arguments espoused by River Crossings and made an appropriate ruling. The District 
Court's Order was based on adequate findings of fact, was correct and based on sound 
conclusions of law, was within its broad and sound discretion and was not clearly 
erroneous. Thus, the District Court's Order should be affirmed and Arbogast should be 
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awarded attorney's fees and costs incurred in defending this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO HEAR ISSUES ON APPEAL 
REGARDING JURISDICTION AND NOTICE UNDER RULES 5 AND 55 
OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
With rare exception, when a court with proper jurisdiction enters a final judgment, 
including a default judgment, that judgment can only be attacked on direct appeal. See 
Olsen v. Bd. of Educ. of Granite Sch. Dist. 571 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1977). River 
Crossings failed to file a Notice of Appeal on the Default Judgment or any issues 
regarding the entry of the Default Judgment. River Crossings cannot now commingle the 
appeal which was never taken on the Default Judgment with its appeal from the denial of 
its Rule 60(b) motion. 
The Utah Appellate Court previously held in the case of State v. Todd, 2004 UT 
App 266, 98 P.3d 46, that "[i]f an appeal is not timely filed, this court lacks jurisdiction to 
hear the appeal." fSerrato v. Utah Transit Auth., 13 P.3d 616, cert, denied. 21 P.3d 218 
(Utah 2001).) "When a matter is outside the court's jurisdiction it retains only the 
authority to dismiss the action." (Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 570 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).) 
On August 11,2006, the District Court entered a Default Judgment against River 
Crossing in favor of Arbogast. (R. at 35-36). Pursuant to Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, River Crossings' deadline by which to file a timely notice of appeal 
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from the Default Judgment was September 10, 2006.1 (URAP 4(a) (2007)). River 
Crossings failed to file a notice of appeal from the Default Judgment within thirty (30) 
days from the date of entry of the Default Judgment. Instead of appealing the entry of 
the Default Judgment, River Crossings filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment and 
Orders on or about September 26, 2006.2 (R. at 45-46). Subsequently, on or about April 
16, 2007, the District Court denied River Crossings' Motion for Relief from Judgment 
and Orders. (R. at 115-124). 
On or about May 7, 2007, River Crossings did file a Notice of Appeal appealing 
the District Court's denial of its Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from Judgment and Orders. 
(R. at 139-140). Although the Notice of Appeal filed by River Crossings was timely in 
regards to the Rule 60(b) motion, this Notice of Appeal is ineffective and untimely for 
seeking appellate review from the Default Judgment. (URAP 4(a) (2007)). "Appellate 
review of Rule 60(b) orders must be narrowed...lest Rule 60(b) become a substitute for 
1
 Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure states as follows, "Appeal 
from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal is permitted as a matter of 
right from the trial court to the appellate court, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 
shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the date of entry of the 
judgment or order appealed from. However, when a judgment or order is entered in a 
statutory forcible entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 
3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days after the date of entry of the 
judgment or order appealed from." 
2
 Motions filed under Rule 60(b) do not toll the time for appeal. Lord v. Lord, 709 
P.2d 338, 339 n.l (Utah 1985). 
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timely appeals.3" Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin. 2000 UT App 110, f 19, 2 
P.3d 451 (quoting 12 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 60.68[3] (3d 
ed.1999)). 
As required by Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, River 
Crossings had thirty (30) days from the entry of the Default Judgment in which to file a 
direct appeal.(URAP 4(a) (2007)). River Crossings failed to file a notice of appeal on the 
Default Judgment by the prescribed deadline. River Crossings first Notice to Appeal was 
filed on May 7, 2007. (R. at 139-140). Therefore, the Utah Appellate Court lacks 
jurisdiction to hear the appeal of the Default Judgment or to inquire into the merits 
thereto. Hence, the Default Judgment or the matters relating to the entry thereof are not 
properly on appeal and should not be considered. See Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 
767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
II. A PARTY MUST FIRST RAISE THE ISSUE IN THE TRIAL COURT TO 
ALLOW THE TRIAL COURT TO RULE ON THE ISSUE IN ORDER TO 
PROPERLY RESERVE THE ISSUE FOR APPELLATE REVIEW. 
A. River Crossings' argument that the default judgment should be set 
aside for lack of notice under Rule 5(a)(2)(B) should not be heard by 
3
 The quoted sentence was taken from the following exert, [Ejven when an order 
on a Rule 60(b) motion is appealable, the appeal is narrow in scope. An appeal of a Rule 
60(b) order addresses only the propriety of the denial or grant of relief. The appeal does 
not, at least in most cases, reach the merits of the underlying judgment from which relief 
was sought. Appellate review of Rule 60(b) orders must be narrowed in this manner lest 
Rule 60(b) become a substitute for timely appeals. An inquiry into the merits of the 
underlying judgment or order must be the subject of a direct appeal from that judgment or 
order. 
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this Court as it was not raised at the district court level. 
River Crossings first seeks relief by raising for the fir$t time on appeal the issue 
that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to enter the Default Judgment. River Crossings 
bases its argument by alleging notice of the default proceedings under Rules 5 and 55 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was not provided to River Crossings. (Appellant's Br. 
at 10-14). "As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on 
appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 11, 10 P.3d 346. See State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996) ("It is a well-established rule that a defendant who fails to bring an 
issue before the trial court is generally barred from raising it for the first time on 
appeal.").4 
Here, in addition to River Crossings failure to directly appeal the entry of the 
Default Judgment as discussed supra, River Crossings also failed to plead at the District 
Court level the allegation that River Crossings did not receive notice of the initiation of 
default proceedings under Rules 5 and 55 in their Motion for Relief from Judgment and 
Orders. (R. at 139-140). The only time River Crossings raised the issue of "notice" 
under Rules 55 and 5 was at the hearing on River Crossings' Rule 60(b) motion. (R. at 
185). At said hearing, River Crossings' Utah counsel only referenced Rule 55 when 
4
 See also State v. Richins, 2004 UT App 36, f 8, 86 P.3d 759 ("In order to 
preserve an issue for appeal, it. . . must be specifically raised such that the issue is 
sufficiently raised to a level of consciousness before the trial court, and must be supported 
by evidence or relevant legal authority." 
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arguing its Rule 60(b) motion by stating, "And Nevada counsel, or under Nevada rules, in 
fact, it's Rule 55, which is different from ours, there's to be a three day notice given 
before default is entered." (R. at 185 at Pg. 7 ffi[ 18-20). 
Although mentioned, River Crossings' reference to Rule 55 was only used in 
support of its argument that it was mistaken in its belief that Rule 55 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure was the same as Rule 55 of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. at 
185 at Pg. 7 ff 18-20). River Crossings did not argue under Rule 55 that notice was fatal 
to the district court having jurisdiction but only that River Crossings was reasonably 
mistaken under Rule 60(b) as to the difference between Utah and Nevada laws. (R. at 
185 at Pg. 7 ^j 18-20). River Crossings failed to make such a claim before the District 
Court. Therefore, it may not now be raised on appeal. See Varian-Eimac. Inc. v. 
Lamoreaux at 570. 
In addition to Rule 55, River Crossings only referenced Rule 5(a)(2) to support its 
argument of mistake under Rule 60(b)(1). (R. at 185). In fact, River Crossings actually 
argued to the District Court that Rule 5(a)(2) did not apply to the case as River Crossings 
had failed to formally appear. (R. at 185 at Pg. 24). River Crossings stated, "Under the 
rules, they did not need to give notice under Rule 5(a)(2). So, under the rules, we are not 
suggesting that counsel acted improperly." (R. at 185 at Pg. 24 ffl[ 20-23). Pursuant to the 
record, the issue of whether the District Court lacked jurisdiction for Arbogast's alleged 
failure to comply with the notice requirement of Rule 5(a)(2) was never raised at the 
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district-court level. (R. at 47-56, 95-101, 185). 
River Crossings is trying to raise new issues on appeal) through the back door of its 
Rule 60(b) motion appeal and River Crossings is contradicting its earlier position. Either 
way, the issues River Crossings raises on appeal are barred utider the principle that issues 
must be specifically raised to a level of consciousness before| the trial court and must be 
supported by evidence or relevant legal authority or it is barred on appeal. See Varian-
Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux at 570. As such, the issue of the district court lacking 
jurisdiction and the issue that Arbogast failed to give notice of the default proceedings 
under Rules 55 and 5 are barred in this appeal. 
III. EVEN IF THE ISSUE OF NOTICE IS TO BE CONSIDERED ON THIS 
APEAL, RIVER CROSSINGS FAILED TO FORJMALLY APPEAR SO AS 
TO NOT REQUIRE ARBOGAST TO PROVIDE NOTICE OF DEFAULT 
TO RIVER CROSSINGS PURSUANT TO RULE 5(a)(2)(B) OF THE UTAH 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
A. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding that River 
Crossings failed to formally appear. 
Even if this argument was properly brought before tliis Court, the argument is 
unavailing as the District Court properly exercised jurisdiction over the parties and River 
Crossings was not entitled to notice as it failed to formally appear. 
Rule 5(a)(2)(B) states, "No service need be made on|parties in default except that a 
party in default for any reason other than for failure to appelar shall be served with all 
pleadings and papers." Additionally, pursuant to Rule 55(b)(1)(A), "[u]pon request of the 
plaintiff the clerk shall enter judgment for the amount clain(ied and costs against the 
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defendant if: the default of the defendant is for failure to appear." (URCP 55(b)(1)(A) 
(2007)). 
The District Court specifically found that pursuant to Rule 5(a)(2) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, River Crossings' counsel did not formally appear in the district 
court case. (R. at 120 f 29). This finding is supported by River Crossings 
acknowledgment of the same by stating at the Rule 60(b) hearing,5 "[n]ow, we are not 
trying to indicate that there was a formal notice of appearance made because there was 
not." (R. at 185 at Pg. 11, fflf 15-17). Later in the hearing, River Crossings stated, 
"[n]ow, again, we are not - we are not claiming because an appearance was made notice 
should have been given." (R. at 185 at Pg. 12, ffl[ 7-8). River Crossings' counsel went on 
to say that, "[ujnder the rules, they did not need to give notice under Rule 5(a)(2). So, 
under the rules, we are not suggesting that counsel acted improperly." (R. at 185 at Pg. 24 
Iflf 20-23). Pursuant River Crossings' Utah counsel's own understanding of Rule 5, River 
Crossings had not made a formal appearance and thus was not entitled to notice of the 
default proceedings. 
In addition, River Crossings mistakenly presumes that the case of Lund v. Brown, 
2000 UT 75,1f 22, 11 P.3d 277 stands for the proposition that any level of participation 
constitutes an appearance. The Lund court specifically addressed the issues of notice and 
5
 A hearing on River Crossings' Motion for Relief from Judgment and Orders was 
held before the Honorable Eric A. Ludlow at the Fifth Judicial District Court on February 
21,2007. 
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appearance under Rules 55 and 5 at length. In discussing rule 5(a)(2), the court provided, 
Thus, subpart (2) impliedly creates two classes of defaulting parties, those 
in default for failure to appear and those in default fot other reasons. The 
negative pregnant of subpart (2)'s provision that notice need not be given to 
parties in default for failure to appear is that notice should be given to 
parties in default who have made an appearance. Thete is an obvious policy 
justification for distinguishing between these two clashes of defaulting 
parties. 
The Lund court has made a clear classification; (1) pafrties who are in default and 
who have appeared; and (2) parties who are in default and who have not appeared. The 
Lund court went on to clarify the differences between these two classes by distinguishing 
the facts in its case from the facts in Central Bank & Trust v^  Jensen, 656 P.2d 1009, 1011 
(Utah 1982). The Lund court stated. 
In that case, however, we did not address the circumstance where a party 
having already made a formal appearance in a case is subjected to a motion 
for default judgment on a counterclaim. In Central B^ank & Trust, the 
defaulting party never made an appearance prior to having default judgment 
entered against him. 
In Lund, notice was required under Rules 5 and 55 because Lund and B&B had 
made a formal appearance. Whereas in Central Bank & TrUst the defaulting party had 
not made a formal appearance and notice was not required. I Here, are facts are indeed 
similar to Central Bank & Trust. River Crossings did not n]iake a formal appearance 
under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and was thus not entitled to notice under Rule 
5(a)(2). (R. at 120, f 29). As such, the district court's decision to refuse to set aside the 
default judgment was not an abuse of discretion. 
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Therefore, in addition to the statements made by River Crossings' Utah counsel 
and the fact that River Crossings did not support this newly-raised argument of notice by 
providing any evidence or relevant legal authority to the District Court that would suggest 
River Crossings had formally appeared, the District Court did not err in its findings. 
River Crossings did not formally appear in the action and was not entitled to notice of 
default proceedings pursuant to Rule 5 and 55 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 
at 120, Tj 29). Thus, the District Court's finding that River Crossings failed to formally 
appear pursuant to Rule 5(a)(2) was not clearly erroneous and this Court should not 
disturb such decision on appeal.6 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT'S REFUSAL TO SET ASIDE THE FINDINGS OF 
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER DENYING RELIEF 
FROM JUDGMENT AND ORDERS WAS NOT IN ERROR. 
The District Court's Order denying River Crossings Rule 60(b) motion should not 
be reversed as the District Court's decision was based on adequate findings of fact and 
sound conclusions of law. Pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the "court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal 
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) 
6
 River Crossing reliance on Mvers v. Interwest Corp., 632 P.2d 879 (Utah 1981) 
and State v. Vijil. 784 P.2d 1130 (Utah 1989) is misguided. In Mvers v. Interwest Corp., 
the court dealt with the moving party's contention that the action must be dismissed for 
lack of jurisdiction because of defective service of the summons. 
In State v. Vijil. the court dealt with the issue of whether awards entered by state 
agencies through administrative proceedings and then filed with the district court clerk 
for enforcement as judgments are entitled to a presumption of jurisdictional correctness. 
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mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect..." (URCP 60(b)(l)(2007)). 
District courts have broad discretion in deciding whether to set aside a default 
judgment. See Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986). however, such discretion is 
not unlimited as the district court's ruling must be based on ^adequate findings of fact" 
and "on the law." See Lund v. Brown. 11 P.3d 277, 279 (Ut*h 2000). 
I 
In the matter at hand, the District Court based its decision to not set aside the 
default judgment on adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law. Based on the 
findings and the law, the district court found that River Crossings' actions and/or 
inactions in this matter did not rise to the level of excusable neglect, inadvertence, 
surprise or mistake. (R. at 115-124). 
Although there is ample case law restating the rule which sets forth the standards 
required to set aside a default judgment, there is very little c^se law actually defining 
those standards. The Utah Supreme Court attempted to define "excusable neglect" by 
stating, "[w]e have heretofore defined 'excusable neglect' as the exercise of 'due 
diligence' by a reasonably prudent person under similar circumstances." Mini Spas, Inc. 
v. Industrial Commission, 733 P.2d 130, 132 (Utah 1987). 
In Black's Title Inc. v. State Ins. Dept, 991 P.2d 607 (Utah Ct. App. 1999), the 
Black's Title court clarified the meaning of "due diligence" by stating that, "to 
demonstrate that the default was due to excusable neglect, 'the movant must show that he 
has used due diligence and that he was prevented from appearing by circumstances over 
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which he had no control."' Quoting Airkem Intermountain, Inc v. Parker, 513 P.2d 429, 
431 (Utah 1973) (underlined added). 
The following arguments address the findings and conclusions reached by the 
District Court. The arguments evidence that the District Court's Order was based on 
adequate findings of fact, was correctly based on sound conclusions of law, was within its 
broad discretion and was not clearly erroneous. 
V. EVEN IF RIVER CROSSING DID APPEAR, THE NOTIFICATION SENT 
BY ARBOGAST THROUGH THE JUNE 29, 2006 LETTER WAS 
SUFFICIENT UNDER THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
A. Although the District Court found some level of participation by River 
Crossings sufficient so as to constitute an appearance, the District 
Court was correct in finding that Arbogast had provided adequate 
notice to River Crossings. 
The Lund v. Brown court wisely commented, "because the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure are not a model of clarity in explaining notice requirements to parties in 
default, we take this opportunity to elucidate the rules in question." (Id. at 281, f 21). 
Contrary to River Crossings' new allegations espoused for the first time on appeal, 
Arbogast satisfied Rule 5(a)(2) by providing advance written notice to River Crossings 
that the Answer to the Complaint was due within twenty (20) days. Furthermore, River 
Crossings' previous Utah counsel had a like understanding of the Utah rule. (R. at 185 at 
Pg. 24 Iff 20-23). 
In Lund, Lund and B&B Drywall filed an action to foreclose a mechanic's lien 
they had filed on the Browns' property. In response to the action, the Browns filed an 
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answer and counterclaim of their own. Subsequently, before [replies were due to the 
Browns' counterclaim, Lund and B&B filed for bankruptcy ^nd did not respond to the 
counterclaim. 
Then without providing notice, counsel for the Browrts sought a default judgment 
against Lund and B&B for failing to reply to the counterclaim The trial court granted the 
Browns their requested relief and entered a default judgment against Lund and B&B. On 
appeal, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the default judgment for two reasons: (1) the 
mistaken, legitimate and good faith belief by Lund and B&H that no action would or 
could be taken against them due to the filing of bankruptcy Constituted "reasonable 
justification or excuse;" (to be discussed infra) and (2) for failing to provide notice to 
Lund and B&B of initiation of the default proceedings. 
As referenced supra, the Lund court has made a clear classification of parties in 
default; (1) parties who are in default and who have appeared; and (2) parties who are in 
default and who have not appeared. In the present case, the District Court specifically 
found that River Crossings had not appeared pursuant to Rule 5(a)(2). Therefore, 
pursuant to Lund, no notice was required as River Crossing^; falls within the classification 
of a party who was in default and who had not appeared. 
However, the District Court did also find that River Crossings did participate at 
some level so as to constitute an appearance. (R. at 120, f 2J9). Despite such finding, the 
District Court did not find that such appearance required ndtice under Rule 5(a)(2). (R. at 
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120, <| 30). On the contrary, it found the June 29, 2006 Letter sent by Arbogast to River 
Crossings was adequate notice. (R. at 120,129). The material content of the June 29, 
2006 Letter is as follows: 
I have had the opportunity to discuss your client's settlement offer of $10,000.00 
in this matter, proferred by Mr. Corelli of your office. My client has advised that 
he does not wish to accept that offer. 
My client has previously granted your client an extension of time within which to 
answer the complaint. However, given the present state of the case, I am, on 
behalf of my client, hereby requesting that your client file an Answer to the 
complaint within twenty (20) days of the date of this letter.7 
It is noteworthy that River Crossings has never disputed that the June 29, 2006 Letter was 
received. The district court implicitly found that the June 29, 2006 Letter had been 
received by River Crossings. (R. at 120, If 31). The receipt of the June 29, 2006 Letter is 
not what River Crossings disputes. River Crossings disputes that because the language of 
the letter did not actually use the word "default," it was not actually provided notice of 
the same. (Appellants Br. at 10-14). Recognizing such claim, the district court addressed 
River Crossings5 counsel at the hearing on the Rule 60(b) motion and stated the 
following, "Counsel, doesn't that somewhat imply that? I mean, my reading of the letter, 
that's the way I look at it, quite frankly. So..." (R. at 185 atPg. 26ffi[ 8-10). In response 
to the District Court's comments, River Crossings' counsel responded by saying, "Well, 
the implication is there"as he continued to argue the issue of mistake of rules under Rule 
7
 River Crossings disputes the District Court's finding of the word "require" as the 
June 29, 2006 letter used the word "request." Such dispute will be addressed further infa. 
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60(b). (R. at 185 atPg. 26 ffif 11-21). 
Therefore, with the evidence presented to the District Court and the arguments 
heard at the Rule 60(b) hearing, although not specifically spqlled out, the District Court 
adequately found that Arbogast had provided notice to Rivei Crossings of the initiation of 
default proceedings. (R. at 120, f 29). As River Crossings was not entitled to notice 
under Rule 5(a)(2), such notice was more then sufficient to put River Crossings on notice 
that an Answer was due and that default would be imminent. Arbogast's actions actually 
complied with the Lund ruling. Thus, the District Court's finding that notice had been 
provided by Arbogast to River Crossings was correct. 
VI. RIVER CROSSINGS FAILED TO SUFFICIENTLY PROVE EXCUSABLE 
NEGLECT FOR ITS FAILURE TO TIMELY FILE AN ANSWER TO THE 
COMPLAINT. 
A. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying River 
Crossings' Motion for Relief from Judgment and Orders. 
Following Utah statutory and case law, River Crossings' inactions do not rise to 
the level of such "excusable neglect" as to justify the setting aside of the Default 
Judgment. Pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the "court may in 
the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, 
order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect. . ." (URCP 60(b)(1) (2007)). Before a judgment is set aside on the 
grounds of "excusable neglect," it must first determine the meaning and weigh the 
relevant factors of "excusable neglect." 
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The Utah Supreme Court has defined "excusable neglect" by stating, "[w]e have 
heretofore defined 'excusable neglect' as the exercise of 'due diligence' by a reasonably 
prudent person under similar circumstances." Mini Spas, Inc. v. Industrial Commission, 
733P.2dl30, 132 (Utah 1987). 
River Crossings cited the case of Lund v. Brown case and argues it would be 
sound policy to simply set aside the Default Judgment because of the excuses offered and 
that to do so would satisfy justice and due process. (R. at 51-56). However, as the Lund 
court made clear that the excuse or justification must be "reasonable justification or 
excuse for the defendant's failure to appear..." Lund, at TJ11 (Emphasis added). Because 
River Crossings seeks to set the Default Judgment aside on the basis of "excusable 
neglect" or "reasonable justification" and allege that their actions fall within said 
standard, it therefore seems necessary to define "due diligence" and how it relates to 
"excusable neglect." (Appellant's Br. at 17-18). 
B. River Crossings' actions do not fall within the definition of "due 
diligence." 
River Crossings stated in its memorandum, "[a]t all times, Defendant exercised 
due diligence in resolving its dispute with Plaintiff, but the default occurred, in part, due 
to confusion and lapse of response caused by the discharge of Attorney Aileen Cohen 
from her employment at Black, LoBello & Sparks." (R. at 52). 
In Black's Title Inc. v. State Ins. Dept. 991 P.2d 607 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) the 
appellate court clarified the meaning of due diligence by saying, "to demonstrate that the 
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default was due to excusable neglect, 'the movant must shov^ that he has used due 
diligence and that he was prevented from appearing by circumstances over which he had 
no control.'" Quoting Airkem Intermountain, Inc v. Parker, 313 P.2d 429, 431 (Utah 
1973) (emphasis added). Pursuant to the language used by tljie Black's Title court, River 
Crossings' Nevada counsel may only allege "excusable neglect" after a showing of due 
diligence, or in other words, only after showing that for reasons beyond their control, they 
were unable or "prevented" from filing a timely response. IcJ. 
River Crossings alleges the discharge of Attorney Ailben Cohen, the ensuing 
confusion and the reassignment of cases led to, "in part", RiVer Crossings failure to 
timely respond; of which River Crossings claims is sufficient confusion so as to amount 
to "excusable neglect." (R. at 52-53). Although a discharge of employment is regretful, 
said discharge did not result in the type of confusion now pl^ad. River Crossings alleges 
the confusion resulted from a discharge date of June 30, 2006. (R. at 53). (R. at 59, f 10). 
However, it was approximately two (2) weeks prior t() this discharge date that 
Arbogast's attorney, Mr. Utley, spoke with Attorney Tisha fittack-Chernine and Josh 
Correlli. (R. at 119, f 18). (R. at 59, % 13). The reassignment of this case from Aileen 
Cohen to Tisha Black-Chemine and Josh Correlli had taken place well before the June 29, 
2006 Letter requesting that an Answer be filed in response t|o the Complaint. In fact, 
River Crossings acknowledges that the June 29, 2006 Lettef sat on the desk of Tisha 
Black-Chernine as she was out of the office on "extended vacation." (Appellants Br. at 
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17). Thus, River Crossings' failure to respond was not a result of confusion through the 
discharge of an attorney, but the direct result of a lack of due diligence within its control. 
Moreover, Josh Correli of Black Lobello & Sparks knew about the June 29, 2006 
Letter. (R. at 185 at Pg. 8, fflf 21-22). Mr. Correlli took no action as his supervising 
attorney was on vacation. He, like Ms. Black-Chernine, failed to take the necessary 
action of either hiring Utah counsel or to research and compare whether the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure governing default proceedings were the same as Nevada Rules of Civil 
Procedure. (R. at 121). Filing an Answer, contacting Arbogast's counsel or any other act 
may have been viewed as the exercise of due diligence by River Crossings. River 
Crossings simply did nothing. 
River Crossings further attempts to suggest that its lack of due diligence is excused 
by the fact that an email was sent to Arbogast directly offering settlement. (Appellant's 
Br. at 20). This alleged fact is murky at best as there was no evidence, other then self 
serving affidavit testimony, provided to the District Court that such an email was ever 
sent. To point, River Crossings has never produced any evidence of this alleged email, 
sending and/or receipt of the same. (R. at 1-187). 
Furthermore, River Crossings first states in its Statement of Relevant Facts that 
such email was sent on July 25, 2006. (Appellants Br. at 7 If 26). However, later in its 
Brief, River Crossings suggests that this alleged email was sent six days prior to the June 
29, 2006 letter. (Appellants Br. at 17-18). Notwithstanding River Crossings own 
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confusion, this alleged email had no bearing on River Crossings' lack of due diligence or 
the District Court's conclusion of the same. (R. at 115-123). 
The facts remain that River Crossings was served with the Complaint on April 4, 
2006. Arbogast granted two (2) extensions of time to River Crossings to file an Answer 
to the Complaint. Arbogast sent written advance notice (the (June 29, 2006 Letter) that an 
Answer was due within the twenty (20) days; arguably a thir4 (3rd) extension of time. 
Even then, the Default Judgment was not entered until August 11, 2006. 
Again, this case is further distinguishable from Lund y. Brown. In Lund, the 
parties were able to show a good faith misunderstanding of ^ rule of law. Here, there is 
nothing of the sort. Not only did River Crossings not understand Rules 5 and 55 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, it took no action to even become familiar with Utah law. 
(R. at 121). There is no evidence suggesting that it sought advice from Utah counsel 
regarding Utah law nor is there any evidence to suggest that| it even attempted to learn and 
understand the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. at 121). IRiver Crossings was simply 
negligent in assuming the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure were the same as the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. at 121). 
Because Ms. Black-Chernine and Mr. Correli understood Nevada law to require a 
3-day notice prior to the entry of default and did not understand that Utah law does not 
require a 3-day notice prior to entry of default, it is true they were mistaken. (R. at 185 at 
Pg. 8 fflf 18-24). However, the key here is that such mistak0 was not excusable. River 
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Crossings has failed to provide any evidence of due diligence; or in other words, its 
failure to respond was not for reasons beyond its control. See Black's Title Inc. v. State 
Ins. Dept. 991 P.2d 607 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). Arguably, by the June 29, 2006 Letter, 
River Crossings was not only provided these three (3) days notice, but thirty-two (32) 
days notice prior to Arbogast's filing of the Default Certificate. (R. at 119, f 24). 
River Crossings not only failed to show a good faith misunderstanding of Utah 
law, but it has shown a lack of due diligence to even become familiar with Utah law. (R. 
at 121). Due to its failure to exercise due diligence, River Crossings' actions do not fall 
within the intended meaning of "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.. 
." (URCP 60(b)(1) (2007)). Thus, the District Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Order Denying Defendant's Motion for Relief from Judgment and Orders should 
be affirmed. 
C. River Crossings should not be provided relief under Rule 60(b)(3) as 
Arbogast's counsel provided River Crossings' Nevada counsel with 
advance written notice prior to filing the Default Judgment. 
River Crossings further attempts to excuse its Nevada counsel's lack of due 
diligence by attempting to argue that Arbogast's counsel is responsible for River 
Crossings' failure to file a timely response to the Complaint. (R. at 54). River Crossmgs 
states in its Rule 60(b) motion, 
Furthermore, because of Mr.Utley's prior assurances that he would not file 
a Default Judgment without first notifying Defendant's Nevada counsel (as 
is the practice in Nevada), the remaining attorneys at Black LoBello & 
Sparks and the Defendant did not realize that a Default Judgment was 
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imminent. 
(R.at 54). 
However, contrary to River Crossings' assertions, Arbogast's Counsel did provide 
River Crossings' Nevada Counsel with prior notice through the June 29, 2006 Letter. (R. 
at 120, f 29). 
As set forth, there was a conversation between Ms. Black-Chernine, Mr. Correlli 
and Mr. Utley, wherein Mr. Utley informed them that he woijild first provide notice. (R. at 
185). Prior to filing the Default Certificate and Default Judgment, Arbogast, through its 
attorney, provided River Crossings with written advance notice that it was now time to 
file an Answer to Arbogast's Complaint. (R. at 120). Arbogast can not be held 
responsible for River Crossings' Nevada counsels' negligence and failure to exercise due 
diligence. River Crossings could have responded or at least contacted Mr. Utley for 
clarity, if any were needed, to the June 29, 2006 Letter. (R. it 121). 
As held in Black's Title, "because this neglect was caused by Black's failure to 
exercise due diligence, it was not to be excused." See Black at 611. And so it is here; 
River Crossings should not be excused from judgment on account of attorney neglect and 
failure to exercise due diligence and should certainly not be excused by attempting to 
blame Arbogast's counsel who provided actual written advance notice of the need to file 
an Answer within the time period prescribed by the June 29|, 2006 Letter. 
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D. Rule 60(b)(6) does not apply to the relief sought here as River 
Crossings is seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(1). 
Following the arguments set forth above, little attention should be given to River 
Crossings' argument to set aside the default judgment under Rule 60(b)(6), which 
provides relief based on "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of 
judgment." In Black's Title, the court also held, "subsection (6) may not be employed for 
relief when the grounds asserted are encompassed within subsection (1)." Black's Title 
Inc. at 612 quoting Lincoln Benefit Life Ins. Co v. D.T. Southern Properties, 838 P. 2d 
672, 674 (Utah App. 1992). As River Crossings has already argued but has failed to 
present, there is no legitimate, reasonable, good faith excuse that would justify the setting 
aside of the default judgment. 
In the event the Court were to look to Rule 60(b)(6) to determine whether "any 
other reason justifying relief exists, Arbogast respectfully submits that there are no other 
reasons why the relief sought should be granted. As argued above, River Crossings' 
Nevada counsel's confusion and failure to timely respond is the result of failing to 
exercise due diligence, nothing more. Furthermore, contrary to River Crossings' 
argument, River Crossings did have reason to believe that default was imminent as 
Arbogast's counsel did in fact provide prior notice to Defendant's Nevada counsel that a 
response was due within twenty (20) days of the June 29, 2006 Letter. (R. at 120, fflf 29-
31). 
In addition, River Crossings alleges that because meritorious defenses may exist, 
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the same should result in a free pass. (Appellant's Br. at 18). Arbogast respectfully 
suggests otherwise and argues below that a cursory review of the facts reveal simple 
inattentiveness and carelessness that does not justify relief under Rule 60(b)(6). 
E. River Crossings meritorious defenses should not be considered as River 
Crossings has failed to show excusable neglect or provide any other 
reason justifying relief. 
In State v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1983) the Utah Supreme Court held, 
"In order for defendant to be relieved from the default judgment, he must not only show 
that the judgment was entered against him through excusable neglect (or any other reason 
specified in Rule 60, but he must also show that his motion to set aside the judgment was 
timely, and that he has a meritorious defense to the action." Id at 1056. Arbogast does 
not dispute the timeliness of River Crossings' Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief From 
Judgment and Orders, however, Arbogast does assert that although River Crossings 
alleges meritorious defenses, such defenses were immaterial to the district court's ruling 
on the Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief From Judgment and Orders. (R. at 115-124). 
In Musselman, the court went on to quote, "This latter question [of meritorious 
defense] arises only after consideration of the first question fof excusable neglect] and a 
sufficient excuse therefrom being shown.'" Id at 1056. Quoting Board of Education of 
Granite School District v. Cox, 384 P.2d 806 (Utah 1963). In reference to how the courts 
consider meritorious defenses, the Musselman court went oil to say, 
We find merit in defendant's position. This Court's statement in the Cox 
decision clearly sets forth the policy in this jurisdiction requiring that the 
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lower court consider and resolve the question of excusable neglect (when 
the motion to vacate the default judgment is based on excusable neglect) 
prior to its consideration of the issue of whether a meritorious defense 
exists. Furthermore, in accordance with this policy, it is unnecessary, and 
moreover inappropriate, to even consider the issue of meritorious defenses 
unless the court is satisfied that a sufficient excuse has been shown. 
Id at 1056. (Emphasis added). 
In this case, River Crossings is indeed basing its Rule 60(b) Motion, in part, on 
"excusable neglect." (R. at 51-56). However, the District Court found that River 
Crossings failed to show that it exercised due diligence. As a result, the District Court 
found that River Crossings failed to provide a sufficient excuse that would amount to 
"excusable neglect" or "any other reason justifying relief." (R. at 121-124). Unless it is 
determined on this appeal that the District Court clearly abused its discretion and that its 
findings were clearly erroneous, pursuant to Musselman, it would be "inappropriate to 
even consider the issue of meritorious defenses..." Id. See also Katz v. Pierce at 93. 
VII. THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING TO NOT SET ASIDE THE 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED AS THE 
FINDINGS OF FACT WERE NOT FAULTY. 
A ruling on a motion to set aside a default judgment "must be based on adequate 
findings of fact and on the law." (Id. f^ 9). As such, a district court's findings of fact are 
reviewed under a clear error standard of review. Chen v. Stewart, 2005 UT 68, f 1 n.l, 
123 P.3d 416. However, "in order to challenge a couifs factual findings, [River 
Crossings] must first marshal all the evidence in support of the finding and then 
demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding even when 
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viewing it in a light most favorable to the court below." (Id. 
"A finding of fact may be deemed 'clearly erroneous' only if the finding is without 
factual support in the record ... or if the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with 
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." See Jouflas v. Fox 
Television Stations, Inc., 927 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah 1996). The focus on appeal should be 
on those facts that were crucial to the District Court's decision. See Menzies v. Galetka, 
2006 UT 81,13, 150P.3d480. 
A. Based on the evidence marshaled by River Crossings, the District 
Court's finding that there were no communications between the parties 
from June 29, 2006 to August 18, 2006 was not clearly erroneous. 
The District Court properly determined that there was not any communication 
between counsel between the dates of June 29, 2006 and August 18, 2006. (Appellant's 
Br. at 19-20). Contrary to River Crossings' allegations, this fact is not only "technically 
correct" but is significant. (Appellant's Br. at 20). River Crossings would lead this Court 
to believe that a single email sent between the respective parties almost thirty days after 
receiving the June 29, 2006 letter was evidence of ongoing settlement discussions and 
further evidence of River Crossings mistaken belief that Arbogast would not file for 
default without first providing notice. (Appellant's Br. at 20). However, this argument 
fails summarily as the evidence before the District Court and the evidence marshaled 
before this Court shows otherwise. 
Since the inception of the underlying dispute, all negotiations and communications 
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were through legal counsel. (R. at 24, 88-91, 185). In fact, Arbogast had been instructed 
by River Crossings to direct all communication through the office of its legal counsel, 
Black Lobello & Sparks. (R. at 86). That is exactly what Arbogast did. As such, to 
suggest that a single email sent directly to Arbogast regarding settlement (which would 
have been the first of its kind) is evidence of ongoing settlement discussions is a complete 
fallacy and not substantiated by any additional evidence supporting such allegation. 
(Appellant's Br. at 20). 
To further suggest that the findings of the District Court are clearly erroneous 
based on this email is taking such fallacy even further. (Appellant's Br. at 20). Apart 
from being unable to provide any evidence that Arbogast received the email, River 
Crossings has only reproduced the single document. (R. at 102). To suggest the District 
Court erred in making a purported finding where there is no additional evidence to 
support River Crossings' purported allegation of settlement negotiations directly through 
the parties is the clear error as it is not supported by the record in the present case. Thus, 
the District Court's findings were not faulty nor clearly erroneous. See Harris v. IES 
Assocs., 2003 UT App 112, f32, 69 P.3d 297. 
B. The District Court's finding that Arbogast "required" River Crossings 
to file a responsive pleading was not clearly erroneous. 
River Crossings tries to argue semantics. River Crossings argued to the District 
Court that the June 29, 2006 Letter did not "require" that River Crossings file an answer; 
but instead merely "requested]" that an answer be filed. However, the District Court 
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rejected this argument. The words "require" and "request, " although different in 
spelling, meant the exact same thing in the context of the June 29, 2006 Lettter. 
River Crossings would lead this Court to mistakenly believe that the District Court 
erred in finding that the June 29, 2006 letter contained the word "requiring." This of 
course would be erroneous if attempted as the letter actually contained the word 
"requesting." Although such error would not have been fatal to the District Court's 
ruling, that is not what the District Court found. In its findings, the District Court found, 
That on or about June 29, 2006, Plaintiffs counsel sent a letter ("June 29, 
2006 letter") via facsimile transmission to Defendant's counsel, addressed 
to Tisha Black-Chernine and to Josh Correlli, informing both of them that 
Plaintiff had rejected the oral settlement offer and was requiring Defendant 
to file an answer to the complaint within twenty (20) days. 
The District Court was not quoting the June 29, 2006 Letter, the District Court was 
making a finding as to what the June 29, 2006 letter meant ih the context and under the 
circumstances of the case. This finding was based in part on the arguments presented to 
the district court by the parties' respective counsel at the Rule 60(b) motion hearing. (R. 
at 185). In said hearing, Arbogast's counsel, stated that, "Effectively, it says, we aren't 
negotiating any more. We want your answer filed. We have waited patiently for two 
months now. And we want the answer filed. There is the notice. There's the notice that 
if you don't file within 20 days we are going to default you. What else would they expect 
would happen if they didn't file an answer within 20 days?" (R. at 185 at Pg. 21 ffif 18-
24). 
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Upon further argument by both parties' counsel in regards to the June 29, 2006 
Letter and the language regarding the request for an answer and whether such was 
sufficient notice of default proceedings, the District Court replied, "Counsel, doesn't that 
somewhat imply that? I mean, my reading of the letter, that's the way I look at it, quite 
frankly. So..." (R. at 185 at Pg. 26 ff 8-10). Pursuant to the course of dealings between 
the parties, the language of the June 29, 2006 Letter and the arguments presented, the 
District Court correctly found that the June 29, 2006 Letter was effectively "requiring" 
River Crossings to file an answer to the Complaint within twenty (20) days of the June 
29, 2006 Letter or default proceedings would be initiated. (R. at 120, T| 29). This finding 
should not be disturbed on appeal. 
VIII. ATTORNEY FEES 
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, "[a] party 
seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall state the request explicitly and 
set forth the legal basis for such an award." (URAP 24(a)(9) (2007)). "The general rule is 
that when a party who received attorney fees below prevails on appeal, the party is also 
entitled to fees reasonably incurred on appeal." Utah Dept. of Soc. Servs. v. Adams, 806 
P.2d 1193, 1197 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
In the instant case, Arbogast was awarded its attorneys fees and costs at the trial 
court level pursuant to the Default Judgment. (R. at 35-36). "Generally, attorney fees in 
Utah are awarded only as a matter of right under a contract or statute." Foote v. Clark, 
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962 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah 1998). Here, attorneys fees are a matter of right under contract 
pursuant to the Trust Deed Note entered into by the parties and signed by River 
Crossings. (R. at 82). The Trust Deed Note reads in material part. 
If this note is collected by an attorney after default in the payment of principal or 
interest, either with or without suit, the undersigned, jointly and severally, agree to 
pay all costs and expenses of collection including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
(R. at 82). 
Therefore, pursuant to the terms of the Trust Deed Note, the District Court awarded 
Arbogast's its attorney's fees and costs pursuant to the Default Judgment. (R. at 35-36). 
The Default Judgment reads in material part, 
Plaintiff is awarded a money judgment against the Defendant for: (c) for attorney's 
fees in the amount of $4,165.50 and costs of $339.96; and (d) for interest on the 
total judgment at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from the date of this 
Judgment until paid in full, together with after-accruing costs and expenses. 
(R. at 35-36). 
Pursuant to the above arguments, Arbogast is thus entitled to its reasonable 
attorneys incurred on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
River Crossings' allegations of the District Court lacking jurisdiction and the 
default judgment being void for failure of notice under Rules 5 and 55 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure were not preserved at the trial court level, are not properly before this 
Court on appeal and should not be considered. River Crossings has failed to marshal any 
evidence suggesting the District Court's findings were clearly erroneous and that it 
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abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the Default Judgment. As River Crossings' 
actions and/or inactions do not fall within Rule 60(b), the District Court's Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Denying Defendant's Motion for Relief From 
Judgment and Orders should be affirmed. 
DATED this V day of October, 2007. 
FARRIS & UTLEY, P.C. 
Tyler A 
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Tab A 
Rule 5 Service and filing of pleadings and other papers. 
(a) Service When required 
(a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in these rules or as otherwise directed by the court, every judgment, every order 
required by its terms to be served, every pleading subsequent to the original complaint, every paper relating to 
discovery, every written motion other than one heard ex parte, and every written notice, appearance, demand, offer of 
judgment and similar paper shall be served upon each of the parties 
(a)(2) No service need be made on parties in default except that 
(a)(2)(A) a party in default shall be served as ordered by the court, 
(a)(2)(B) a party in default for any reason other than for failure to appear shall b^ served with all pleadings and papers, 
(a)(2)(C) a party in default for any reason shall be served with notice of aqy hearing necessary to determine the 
amount of damages to be entered against the defaulting party, 
(a)(2)(D) a party in default for any reason shall be served with notice of entry of judgment under Rule 58A(d), and 
(a)(2)(E) pleadings asserting new or additional claims for relief against a party in default for any reason shall be served 
in the manner provided for service of summons in Rule 4 
(a)(3) In an action begun by seizure of property, whether through arrest, attachment, garnishment or similar process, in 
which no person need be or is named as defendant, any service required to be made prior to the filing of an answer, 
claim or appearance shall be made upon the person having custody or possession of the property at the time of its 
seizure 
(b) Service How made and by whom 
(b)(1) Whenever under these rules service is required or permitted to be made upon a party represented by an 
attorney, the service shall be made upon the attorney unless service upon the party is ordered by the court If an 
attorney has filed a Notice of Limited Appearance under Rule 75 and the papers being served relate to a matter within 
the scope of the Notice, service shall be made upon the attorney and the party Service upon the attorney or upon a 
party shall be made by delivering a copy or by mailing a copy to the last known address or, if no address is known, by 
leaving it with the clerk of the court 
(b)(1)(A) Delivery of a copy within this rule means Handing it to the attorney or to the party, or leaving it at the person's 
office with a clerk or person in charge thereof, or, if there is no one in charge, leaving it in a conspicuous place therein, 
or, if the office is closed or the person to be served has no office, leaving it at the person's dwelling house or usual 
place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or, if consented to in writing by 
the person to be served, delivering a copy by electronic or other means 
(b)(1)(B) Service by mail is complete upon mailing If the paper served is notice of a hearing and if the hearing is 
scheduled 5 days or less from the date of service, service shall be by delivery or other method of actual notice Service 
by electronic means is complete on transmission if transmission is completed during normal business hours at the 
place receiving the service, otherwise, service is complete on the next business day 
(b)(2) Unless otherwise directed by the court 
(b)(2)(A) an order signed by the court and required by its terms to be served or a judgment signed by the court shall be 
served by the party preparing it, 
(b)(2)(B) every other pleading or paper required by this rule to be served shall be served by the party preparing it, and 
(D)(2)(C) an order or judgment prepared by the court shall be served by the court 
http://www.utcoiirts.gov/resources/mles/urcp/urcp005.html 10/31/2007 
(c) Service Numerous defendants In any action in which there is an unusually large number of defendants, the court, 
upon motion or of its own initiative, may order that service of the pleadings of the defendants and replies thereto need 
not be made as between the defendants and that any cross-claim, counterclaim, or matter constituting an avoidance or 
affirmative defense contained therein shall be deemed to be denied or avoided by all other parties and that the filing of 
any such pleading and service thereof upon the plaintiff constitutes due notice of it to the parties A copy of every such 
order shall be served upon the parties in such manner and form as the court directs 
(d) Filing Ail papers after the complaint required to be served upon a party shall be filed with the court either before or 
within a reasonable time after service The papers shall be accompanied by a certificate of service showing the date 
and manner of service completed by the person effecting service Rule 26(i) governs the filing of papers related to 
discovery 
(e) Filing with the court defined The filing of pleadings and other papers with the court as required by these rules shall 
be made by filing them with the clerk of the court, except that the judge may accept the papers, note thereon the filing 
date and forthwith transmit them to the office of the clerk 
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Rule 55. Default. 
(a) Entry When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend 
as provided by these rules and that fact is made to appear the clerk shall enter the default of that party 
(b) Judgment Judgment by default may be entered as follows 
(b)(1) By the clerk Upon request of the plaintiff the clerk shall enter judgment for the amount claimed and costs against 
the defendant if 
(b)(1)(A) the default of the defendant is for failure to appear, 
(b)(1)(B) the defendant is not an infant or incompetent person, 
(b)(1)(C) the defendant has been personally served pursuant to Rule 4(d)(1), ar)d 
(b)(1)(D) the claim against the defendant is for a sum certain or for a sum that can be made certain by computation 
(b)(2) By the court In all other cases the party entitled to a judgment by default shall apply to the court therefor If, in 
order to enable the court to enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account or to determine 
the amount of damages or to establish the truth of any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any other 
matter, the court may conduct such hearings or order such references as ft deems necessary and proper 
(c) Setting aside default For good cause shown the court may set aside an entry of default and, if a judgment by 
default has been entered, may likewise set it aside in accordance with Rule 60^b) 
(d) Plaintiffs, counterclaimants, cross-claimants The provisions of this rule apply whether the party entitled to the 
judgment by default is a plaintiff, a third-party plaintiff, or a party who has pleaded a cross-claim or counterclaim In all 
cases a judgment by default is subject to the limitations of Rule 54(c) 
(e) Judgment against the state or officer or agency thereof No judgment by default shall be entered against the state 
of Utah or against an officer or agency thereof unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence 
satisfactory to the court 
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Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from 
oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and 
after such notice if any, as the court orders During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected 
before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected 
with leave of the appellate court 
(b) Mistakes, inadvertence, excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, fraud, etc On motion and upon such terms 
as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, 
order or proceeding for the following reasons (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, (2) newly 
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 
59(b), (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an 
adverse party, (4) the judgment is void, (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior 
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment 
should have prospective application, or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment The 
motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3),not more than 3 months after the 
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of 
a judgment or suspend its operation This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to 
relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court The procedure 
for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action 
Advisory Committee Notes 
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Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken. 
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal is permitted as a matter of right from the trial 
court to the appellate court, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 
30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from. However, when a judgment or order is entered 
in a statutory forcible entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the 
clerk of the trial court within 10 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from. 
(b) Time for appeal extended by certain motions. 
(b)(1) If a party timely files in the trial court any of the following motions, the time for all parties to appeal from the 
judgment runs from the entry of the order disposing of the motion: 
(b)(1)(A) a motion for judgment under Rule 50(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
(b)(1 )(B) a motion to amend or make additional findings of fact, whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be 
required if the motion is granted, under Rule 52(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
(b)(1)(C) a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
(b)(1)(D) a motion for a new trial under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; or 
(b)(1)(E) a motion for a new trial under Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
(b)(2) A notice of appeal filed after announcement or entry of judgment, but before entry of an order disposing of any 
motion listed in Rule 4(b), shall be treated as filed after entry of the order and on the day thereof, except that such a 
notice of appeal is effective to appeal only from the underlying judgment. To appeal from a final order disposing of any 
motion listed in Rule 4(b), a party must file a notice of appeal or an amended notice of appeal within the prescribed 
time measured from the entry of the order.(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. A notice of appeal filed after the 
announcement of a decision, judgment, or order but before entry of the judgment or order shall be treated as filed after 
such entry and on the day thereof. 
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a party, any other party may file a notice of appeal 
within 14 days after the date on which the first notice of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by 
paragraphs (a) and (b) of this rule, whichever period last expires. 
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the 
time for filing a notice of appeal upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time prescnbed by 
paragraphs (a) and (b) of this rule. A motion filed before expiration of the prescribed time may be ex parte unless the 
trial court otherwise requires. Notice of a motion filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given to the other 
parties in accordance with the rules of practice of the trial court. No extension shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed 
time or 10 days from the date of entry of the order granting the motion, whichever occurs later. 
(f) Motion to reinstate period for filing a direct appeal in criminal cases. Upon a showing that a criminal defendant was 
deprived of the right to appeal, the trial court shall reinstate the thirty-day period for filing a direct appeal. A defendant 
seeking such reinstatement shall file a written motion in the sentencing court and serve the prosecuting entity, if the 
defendant is not represented and is indigent, the court shall appoint counsel. The prosecutor shall have 30 days after 
service of the motion to file a written response. If the prosecutor opposes the motion, the trial court shall set a hearing 
at which the parties may present evidence. If the trial court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
defendant has demonstrated that he was deprived of his right to appeal, it shall enter an order reinstating the time for 
appeal. The defendant's notice of appeal must be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the date of 
entry of the order. 
(g) Appeal by an Inmate Confined in an Institution, if an inmate confined in an institution files a notice of appeal in 
either a civil or criminal case, the notice of appeal is timely filed if it is deposited in the institution's internal mail system 
on or before the last day for filing. Timely filing may be shown by a notarized statement or written declaration setting 
forth the date of deposit and stating that first-class postage has been prepaid. If a notice of appeal is filed in the 
manner provided in this paragraph (f), the 14-day period provided in paragraph (d) runs from the date when the trial 
court receives the first notice of appeal. 
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Advisory Committee Note: 
Subsection (f) was adopted to implement the holding and procedure outlined in Manning v State, 2005 UT 61
 f 122 
P 3d 628 
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Rule 24. Briefs. 
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under appropriate headings and in the order indicated: 
(a)(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency whose judgment or order is sought to be 
reviewed, except where the caption of the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties. The list should be set 
out on a separate page which appears immediately inside the cover. 
(a)(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page references, (a)(3) A table of authorities 
with cases alphabetically arranged and with parallel citations, rules, statutes an i^ other authorities cited, with references 
to the pages of the brief where they are cited. 
(a)(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court. 
(a)(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue: the standard of appellate review with 
supporting authority; and 
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial bourt; or 
(a)(5)(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial court. 
(a)(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose interpretation is determinative of the 
appeal or of central importance to the appeal shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the pertinent part 
of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the provision shall be set forth in an addendum to the brief 
under paragraph (11) of this rule. 
(a)(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the nature of the case, the course of 
proceedings, and its disposition in the court below. A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review 
shall follow. All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the 
record in accordance with paragraph (e) of this rule. 
(a)(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of 
the arguments actually made in the body of the brief. It shall not be a mere repetition of the heading under which the 
argument is arranged. 
(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues 
presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the 
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record 
evidence that supports the challenged finding. A party seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall state 
the request explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such an award. 
(a)(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought. 
(a)(11) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary under this paragraph. The addendum 
shall be bound as part of the brief unless doing so makes the brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound 
separately, the addendum shall contain a table of contents. The addendum shall contain a copy of: 
(a)(11)(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central importance cited in the brief but not 
reproduced verbatim in the brief; 
(a)(11)(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appeals opinion; in all cases any court opinion 
of central importance to the appeal but not available to the court as part of a regularly published reporter service; and 
(a)(11)(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to the determination of the appeal, such as 
the challenged instructions, findings of fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the court's 
oral decision, or the contract or document subject to construction. 
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(b) Brief of the appellee The brief of the appellee shall conform to the requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule, 
except that the appellee need not include 
(b)(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied with the statement of the appellant or 
(b)(2) an addendum except to provide material not included in the addendum of the appellant The appellee may refer 
to the addendum of the appellant 
(c) Reply brief The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the appellee, and if the appellee has cross-
appealed the appellee may file a brief in reply to the response of the appellant to the issues presented by the cross-
appeal Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in the opposing brief The content of the 
reply brief shall conform to the requirements of paragraphs (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule No further briefs may 
be filed except with leave of the appellate court 
(d) References in briefs to parties Counsel will be expected in their briefs and oral arguments to keep to a minimum 
references to parties by such designations as "appellant" and "appellee " It promotes clarity to use the designations 
used in the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the actual names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the 
employee " "the injured person,' "the taxpayer," etc 
(e) References in briefs to the record References shall be made to the pages of the original record as paginated 
pursuant to Rule 11 (b) or to pages of any statement of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared 
pursuant to Rule 11 (f) or 11 (g) References to pages of published depositions or transcripts shall identify the sequential 
number of the cover page of each volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right corner and each separately 
numbered page(s) referred to within the deposition or transcript as marked by the transcriber References to exhibits 
shall be made to the exhibit numbers If reference is made to evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy, 
reference shall be made to the pages of the record at which the evidence was identified, offered, and received or 
rejected 
(f) Length of briefs Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs shall 
not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of pages containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum 
containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as required by paragraph (a) of this rule In cases 
involving cross-appeals, paragraph (g) of this rule sets forth the length of briefs 
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals If a cross-appeal is filed, the party first filing a notice of appeal shall be 
deemed the appellant, unless the parties otherwise agree or the court otherwise orders Each party shall be entitled to 
file two briefs No brief shall exceed 50 pages, and no party's briefs shall in combination exceed 75 pages 
(g)(1) The appellant shall file a Brief of Appellant, which shall present the issues raised in the appeal 
(g)(2) The appellee shall then file one brief, entitled Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant, which shall respond to the 
issues raised in the Brief of Appellant and present the issues raised in the cross-appeal 
(g)(3) The appellant shall then file one brief, entitled Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief of Cross-Appellee, which shall 
reply to the Brief of Appellee and respond to the Brief of Cross-
Appellant 
(g)(4) The appellee may then file a Reply Brief of Cross-Appellant, which shall reply to the Brief of Cross-Appellee 
(h) Permission for over length brief While such motions are disfavored, the court for good cause shown may upon 
motion permit a party to file a brief that exceeds the limitations of this rule The motion shall state with specificity the 
issues to be briefed, the number of additional pages requested, and the good cause for granting the motion A motion 
filed at least seven days before the date the brief is due or seeking five or fewer additional pages need not be 
accompanied by a copy of the brief A motion filed less than seven days before the date the brief is due and seeking 
more than 5 additional pages shall be accompanied by a copy of the draft brief for in camera inspection If the motion is 
granted any responding party is entitled to an equal number of additional pages without further order of the court 
Whether the motion is granted or denied, the draft brief will be destroyed by the court 
(i) Briefs m cases involving multiple appellants or appellees In cases involving more than one appellant or appellee, 
including cases consolidated for purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief, and any 
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appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of the brief of another Parties may similarly join in reply briefs 
(j) Citation of supplemental authorities When pertinent and significant authorities come to the attention of a party after 
that party's bnef has been filed or after oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly advrse the clerk of the 
appellate court by letter setting forth the citations An original letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme 
Court An original letter and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals There shall be a reference either to the 
page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the citations pertain, but the letter shall without argument state the 
reasons for the supplemental citations Any response shall be made within 7 days of filing and shall be similarly limited 
(k) Requirements and sanctions All briefs under this rule must be concise, presented with accuracy, logically arranged 
with proper headings and free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters Briefs which are not in 
compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, and the court may assess attorney 
fees against the offending lawyer 
Advisory Committee Note Rule 24 (a)(9) now reflects what Utah appellate courts have long held See In re Beesley, 
883 P 2d 1343, 1349 (Utah 1994), Newmeyer v Newmeyer, 745 P 2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1987) 'To successfully 
appeal a trial court's findings of fact, appellate counsel must play the devil's advocate 'Attorneys must extricate 
themselves from the client's shoes and fully assume the adversary's position In order to properly discharge the 
marshalling duty , the challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent 
evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists '" ONEIDA/SLIC, v ONEIDA Cold 
Storage and Warehouse, Inc , 872 P 2d 1051, 1052-53 (Utah App 1994) (alteration in onginal)(quoting West Valley 
Cityv Majestic Inv Co , 818 P 2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App 1991)) See also State ex rel MS v Salata, 806 P 2d 1216, 
1218 (Utah App 1991), Bell v Eider, 782 P 2d 545, 547 (Utah App 1989), State v Moore, 802 P 2d 732, 738-39 (Utah 
App 1990) 
The bnef must contain for each issue raised on appeal, a statement of the applicable standard of review and citation of 
supporting authority 
http://www.utcourts.go 10/31/2007 
TabB 
FU-' 
imw$ 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT m 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OWTAH 
LU-
ARBOGAST FAMILY TRUST, by and 
through RODNEY J. ARBOGAST as 
TRUSTEE, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
RTVERCROSSINGS, LLC, a Nevada Limited 
Liability Company, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND ORDER DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RELIEF 
FROM JUDGMENT AND ORDERS 
Civil No. 060500096 
Judge Eric A. Ludlow 
On February 21, 2007, this matter came before the Court for hearing on the Motion for 
Relief from Judgment and Orders submitted by Defendant River Crossings, LLC. Defendant's 
Managing Member, Michael Chernine was present along with represented counsel of record, 
Jeffrey C. Wilcox, of the law firm of Gallian, Wilcox, Welker & Olson, L.C. Plaintiff, Rodney J. 
Arbogast, as Trustee of the Arbogast Family Trust, was present albng with represented counsel of 
record, Chad J. Utley, of the law firm of Farris & Utley, PC. This Court, having reviewed all 
pleadings of record and considered the oral arguments of counsel, hereby FINDS and ORDERS 
as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1 
That the Arbogast Family Trust (hereinafter "Plaintiff') provided River Crossings, LLC 
(hereinafter ''Defendant") with a loan in the amount of two million four hundred fifty 
thousand dollars ($2,450,000.00) (hereinafter "loan"). 
That the loan was secured by a Trust Deed Note dated September 16, 2004. 
That pursuant to express terms of the Trust Deed Note, any remaining unpaid balance, 
along with accrued interest, was due and payable on September 16, 2005 (hereinafter 
"maturity date"). 
That the Trust Deed Note provided a schedule of payments as follows: The sum of 
eighteen thousand three hundred seventy-five dollars ($18,375.00) monthly, interest only, 
beginning on October 16, 2004, and a like sum of eighteen thousand three hundred 
seventy-five dollars ($18,375.00) monthly on the 16th day of each and every month 
thereafter until the 16th day of September, 2005. 
After the 16th of September, 2005, the entire remaining unpaid balance, together with 
interest accrued thereon, (hereinafter "final payment") was to become immediately due 
and payable. (See copy of Trust Deed Note attached as Exhibit "A" to Defendant's 
Memorandum In Opposition to Motion). 
That on or about the 16th of September, 2005, when the remaining unpaid principal 
balance, together with interest accrued thereon, became due and payable, Defendant was 
unable and/or failed to tender the final payment. 
Defendant paid the final payment to Plaintiff on October 7, 2005, twenty-one (21) days 
later. 
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8. That the Trust Deed Note signed on September 16, 2004, expressly provided by its terms 
a penalty for late payment (hereinafter "late payment penalty") as follows: 
A late payment penalty of six percent (6%) if any payments shall 
be assessed against the maker if said payment has not been 
received by Holder [Plaintiff] within five (5) days of the due date. 
Each payment shall be credited first to any late payments due, then 
to accrued interest due and the remainder to principal Any such 
installment not paid when due shall bear interest thereafter at the 
rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum until paid. 
{See copy of Trust Deed Note attached to Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition as 
Exhibit "A".) 
9. That Defendant disputed and refused to pay the late payment penalty. 
10. That on or about October 6, 2005 and as a result of Defendant's dispute over the late 
payment penalty, Defendant authorized Southern Utah Title Company to withhold one 
hundred seventy-eight thousand five hundred thirty-nine dollars ($178,539.31) 
(hereinafter "escrowed funds") and to hold said amount in escrow pending the resolution 
of the dispute. (See copy of Escrow Instruction/Holdback Agreement attached as Exhibit 
"B" to Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition.) 
11. That the Escrow Instruction/Holdback Agreement provided, in part, that the title company 
would disburse the funds in accordance with the parties' agreement, or if no agreement, 
then in accordance with a court order. Id. 
12. That Plaintiff and Defendant attempted to reach and agreement concerning the 
interpretation of the late payment penalty, but the parties were unable to come to an 
agreement. Subsequently, on January 10, 2006, Plaintiff filed its complaint which 
initiated the instant case for declaratory judgment. 
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That on or about December 20, 2005, Plaintiffs counsel received a letter from Josh 
Corelli, on behalf of Tisha Black-Chernine, informing Plaintiff that Defendant had 
retained the legal services of Black, Lobello & Pitegoff (See copy of Josh Corelli Letter 
attached to Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition as "Exhibit C;" see also Affidavit of 
Chad J. Utley at % 4). 
That Plaintiff attempted to serve Defendant. However, despite diligent efforts to locate 
and serve Defendant, Plaintiff was unable to effectuate service. Thereafter, Plaintiff 
sought and obtained an Order of Alternative Service which granted Plaintiff permission to 
serve Defendant's counsel. 
That on April 4, 2006, Plaintiff served Defendant's counsel, Tisha Black-Chernine, at the 
firm of Black, Lobello and Pitegoff. 
That Plaintiffs counsel granted Defendant's Nevada counsel, Aileen E. Cohen of Black, 
Lobello & Pitegoff, two (2) separate extensions of time in which to respond to Plaintiff's 
complaint for for the purpose of engaging in settlement negotiations and/or to seek Utah 
counsel (See copy of Aileen E. Cohen Letters attached as "Exhibit D" to Plaintiff's 
Memorandum in Opposition.) 
That on June 14, 2006 the second (2nd) of the two (2) time extensions granted through 
Plaintiffs counsel to Defendant's counsel expired. (See letter from Ms. Cohen attached 
as "Exhibit D" of Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition; see also, f7 of Affidavit of 
Chad J. Utley attached to Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition). 
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18. That sometime between June 14, 2006, and June 28, 2006, Mr. Utley had contact with 
Defendant's counsel, Tisha Black-Chermne, and also with Josh Corelli, both of the law 
firm of Black, LoBello & Sparks. (See Affidavit of Chad J. Utley). 
19. That on or about June 28, 2006, Josh Corelli offered sum certain as settlement via the 
telephone to Mr. Utley. (See Affidavit of Chad J. Utley attached to Plaintiffs 
Memorandum in Opposition). 
20. That on or about June 29, 2006, Plaintiffs counsel sent a letter ("June 29, 2006 letter") 
via facsimile transmission to Defendant's counsel, addressed to Tisha Black-Chernine 
and to Josh Corelli, informing both of them that Plaintiff had rejected the oral settlement 
offer and was requiring Defendant to file an answer to the complaint within twenty (20) 
days. (See Letter from Chad J. Utley dated June 29, 2006, attached to Plaintiffs 
Memorandum in Opposition as Exhibit "E.") 
21. There were no other extensions were granted to Defendant to answer Plaintiffs complaint 
after Plaintiff, through counsel, sent the June 29, 2006 letter. 
22. There were not any other discussions between Plaintiffs counsel and Defendant's 
counsel between the June 29, 2006 and August 18, 2006. 
23. Pursuant to the June 29, 2006 letter, an answer was to be fped within twenty (20) days of 
June 29, 2006. 
24. That Plaintiffs counsel waited approximately thirty-two (32) calendar days, prior to 
Plaintiffs filing the Default Notice of Default with this Court. 
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25. That on July 31, 2006, Plaintiff filed of record in this matter a Certificate of Default due 
to Defendant's failure to answer Plaintiffs complaint which was served on April 4, 2006; 
approximately four (4) months after service of the complaint upon Defendant. 
26. That on August 11, 2006, a default judgment was entered of record in favor of Plaintiff 
against Defendant. 
27. That on August 17, 2006, Notice of Entry of Default Judgment was filed with the Court 
and was sent by Plaintiff the Defendant. 
28. That Plaintiff did not receive any communication from Defendant from the time of the 
June 28, 2006 teleconference until an August 18, 2006 telephone call from Defendant's 
counsel, Tisha Black-Chernine to Plaintiffs counsel. 
29. That pursuant to URCP Rule 5(a)(2), Defendant's counsel has not formally appeared in 
the instant action. Nevertheless, Defendant's counsel's notification and communications 
with Plaintiffs counsel constitute an appearance and there was adequate notice was given 
to Defendant, pursuant to the June 29, 2006 letter, that an answer was required to be filed 
in response to Plaintiffs complaint. 
30. That the contention that Defendant's counsel expected notice prior to the default entry is 
unfounded given the express provisions of the June 29, 2006 letter. 
31. That there was, on the part of the Defendant, a failure to exercise due diligence by failing 
to follow up or otherwise communicate with Plaintiffs counsel after receiving the June 
29, 2006 letter and by failing to file an answer after having been requested to do so after 
Plaintiff provided Defendant with written notice that the time for extensions had 
concluded and that the settlement offer had been rejected. 
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32. That the lack of due diligence resulted in Defendant's failure tb respond to Plaintiffs 
complaint within the allotted time. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Court has broad discretion in deciding whether to set aside the default judgment. 
Relief under Rule 60(b) is remedial in nature and as such this Court's discretion is limited and 
has to be set within the confines of existing case law. In accordance with Utah law and the Facts 
set forth above, this Court concludes that Defendant's actions and inactions in this matter do not 
rise to the level of excusable neglect, inadvertence, surprise or mistake. 
Defendant's counsel's purported reliance upon Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure is not 
reasonable and does not constitute excusable neglect. This Court relies, in part, upon the case of 
Mini Spas, Inc. V. Industrial Commission, 733 P.2d 130, 132 (Utah 1987) for the premise that 
excusable neglect is the exercise of due diligence by a reasonable and prudent person under 
similar circumstances. 
It would have been minimally prudent on the part of the Defendant to have taken steps 
necessary to investigate their client's claim in the State of Utah, to become familiar with Utah 
law and/or to consult a Utah counsel in order to protect Defendant's interest, rather than rely 
upon the belief that Utah's Rules of Civil Procedures were identical to the Rules of Civil 
Procedure enacted by the State of Nevada. Defendant has therefore failed to demonstrate that 
Defendant used sufficient due diligence in trying to respond to Plaintiffs complaint or to address 
Plaintiffs June 29, 2006 letter. Defendant simply was not prevented from either answering the 
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complaint or from responding to the June 29, 2006 letter by circumstances over which Defendant 
did not have any control (See, e g , Black's Title, Inc, v State Ins Dep % 991 P.2d 607 (Utah 
Ct. App 1999) mdAirkem Intermountain, Inc v Parker, 513 P 2d 429 (Utah 1973)). 
Defendant has argued that the discharge of Defendant's counsel Aileen Cohen resulted in 
ensuing confusion that lead to excusable neglect However, it the ultimate discussions 
surrounding the settlement offer and the June 29, 2006 letter were not addressed to Ms. Cohen, 
the departing attorney, but to Ms. Tisha Black-Chernine and Mr. Josh Correlli, the individuals 
with whom Plaintiffs counsel had been discussing the most recent settlement offer. Based upon 
the foregoing facts, Defendant's excuses for its failure to answer Plaintiffs complaint do not 
constitute excusable neglect, inadvertent surprise or mistake on behalf of Defendant or that 
Defendant's counsel's actions and inactions rise to the level under which would allow relief to be 
granted under URCP 60(b). 
The facts, allegations and circumstances argued by the Defendant to set aside the 
judgment are properly categorized under URCP 60(b)(1), involving "mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise, or excusable neglect," and not under URCP 60(b)(6). In Black's Title, Inc., 991 P.2d at 
612, the Utah Appellate Court found that "subsection (6) may not be employed for relief when 
the grounds asserted are encompassed within subsection (1)." The allegations and facts argued 
by Defendant are encompassed within subsection 1 of URCP 60(b) and are, therefore, not 
considered under subsection (6). 
The Court concludes that Plaintiff rightfully could interpret Defendant's inaction in the 
instant matter to be Defendant's acquiescence to the allegations contained in Plaintiffs 
complaint. Defendant was given adequate notice to file an answer, but failed to do so and also 
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failed to contact Plaintiffs counsel to either seek an additional extension or for clarification of 
the June 29, 2006 letter. Therefore, based upon the foregoing facts, Defendant's Motion to Set 
Aside the Default Judgment should be denied. 
ORDER 
WHEREFORE, after consideration of the arguments of the parties, the pleadings filed by 
the parties and the documents on file with the Court, and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
1. That Defendant's Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment is hereby denied; and, 
2. The Default Judgment entered of record in this matter on August 11, 2006 remains in full 
force and effect. 
DATED this l v g day of April, 2007. 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorable Eric A. Ludlow 
District Court Judge 
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GALLIAN, WILCOX, WELKER & OLSON, L.C 
Jeffrey C. Wilcox, #4441 
59 South 100 East 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Telephone: (435) 628-1682 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT, WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ARBOGAST FAMILY TRUST, by and ; 
Through RODNEY J. ARBOGAST as 
TRUSTEE, ; 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
RTVER CROSSINGS, LLC, a Nevada ; 
Limited Liabihty Company, ] 
Defendant. ] 
) MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
) AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
) DEFENDANT'S RULE 60(b) 
) MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM 
) JUDGMENT AND ORDERS 
) Civil No.: 060500096 
) Judge: Eric A. Ludlow 
Pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1), Rule 60(b)(3) and Rule 60(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, RTVER CROSSINGS, LLC ("Defendant") through undersigned counsel, submits this 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of its Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief From 
Judgment and Orders. 
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This matter calls for a reexamination by the Court. The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
permit the Court and the parties to review and correct the harshness of enforcing a judgment, 
z r , i K I;: II 
fit 
which may have occurred through procedural difficulties, the wrongs of the opposing party, or 
misfortune which prevented a party from presenting a claim or defense. Here, Defendant relies 
on Rule 60(b)(1), Rule 60(b)(3) and Rule 60(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for relief 
from the August 11, 2006 Default Judgment. 
II. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
(See Affidavit of Tisha Black Chemine, attached as "Exhibit A", and the Complaint and Default 
Judgment on file herein) 
Respondent will provide only an abbreviated version of the facts as this matter has been 
in front of the court several times and was just recently before the court. 
1. On or around September 16, 2004, ARBOGAST FAMILY TRUST ("Plaintiff) 
provided Defendant with a loan in the amount of Two Million Four Hundred Fifty Thousand 
Dollars ($2,450,000.00) (hereinafter "Loan"). See Complaint on file herein, f 7. 
2. The Loan was secured by a Trust Deed Note dated September 16, 2004. The signed 
Trust Deed Note dictated the following schedule of payments: On October 16, 2004, the sum of 
$18,375.00 was due. Thereafter, the like sum was due on the 16th day of each month until the 
16th of September, 2005, when the remaining unpaid balance, together with accrued interest, was 
due and payable. See Complaint, f 8. 
3. The subject Trust Deed Note also included the following terms regarding a penalty for 
late payments (hereinafter "Late Payment Penalty"): "A late payment penalty of Six percent 
(6.0%) of any payment due shall be assessed against the Maker if said payment has not been 
received by Holder within five (5) days of the due date." See Complaint, f 11. 
4. There is a dispute as to whether, sometime before September 16, 2005, Plaintiff 
granted Defendant an extension for the due date of the final payment. See Affidavit of Tisha 
Black Chemine, % 4. 
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5. Twenty-one (21) days after September 16, 2005, on October 7, 2005, Defendant made 
the final payment. See Complaint, f 10. 
6. Thereafter, Plaintiff asserted a Late Payment Penalty against Defendant in the amount 
of One Hundred Forty Eight Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Six Dollars ($148,176.00) plus 
accruing interest thereon at the rate of Twelve percent (12%) per] annum from the date of October 
7, 2005 to the present. See Complaint, f 12. 
7. Since October 7, 2005, there has been a dispute between the Plaintiff and the 
Defendant regarding, without limitation, the due date of the final payment and the enforceability 
of the Late Payment Penalty. See Affidavit ofTisha Black Chernine, Tf 4. 
8. Since the inception of the above identified disputes, the parties have participated in 
several settlement negotiations. See Affidavit ofTisha Black Chernine, f 7. 
9. On or around October 26, 2005, Plaintiff retained Attorney Chad Utley to represent it 
for the above identified disputes. See Affidavit ofTisha Black Chernine, f 5. 
10. On or around January 10, 2006, Plaintiff filed a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment 
(Civil No. 06050096) in the Fifth Judicial District Court, Washington County, State of Utah. See 
Complaint. 
11. Since the filing of the underlying Complaint, regarding the above-identified disputes, 
Mr. Utley has been in contact with Defendant's Nevada counsel the law firm of Black LoBello 
& Sparks. See Affidavit ofTisha Black Chernine, ^ 6. 
12. During the ongoing settlement negotiations process, Plaintiff granted Defendant 
three extensions for its responsive pleading. See Affidavit ofTisha Black Chernine, 1f 8. 
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13. On or around June 16, 2006, Mr. Utley expressly stated to Defendant's Nevada 
counsel that he would not file a Default Judgment without first notifying them of Plaintiff s 
intent to file a default. See Affidavit ofTisha Black Chernine, ^  13. 
14. Until the discharge of her employment at Black LoBello & Sparks, which occurred 
on or around June 30, 2006, Attorney Aileen Cohen was in charge of the communications and 
settlement negotiations with Plaintiffs counsel. See Affidavit ofTisha Black Chernine, f 11. 
15. The discharge of Ms. Aileen Cohen inadvertently caused matters regarding the 
subject matter to not be immediately addressed. See Affidavit ofTisha Black Cheimine^ ^[12. 
16. On or around July 25, 2006, Defendant attempted to request another settlement 
negotiations conference with Plaintiff to discuss the above-identified disputes. See Affidavit of 
Tisha Black Chernine, If 16. 
17. On or around July 31, 2006, Plaintiff presented this Court with a Certificate of 
Default. See August 11, 2006 Default Judgment of file herein. 
18. On August 11, 2006, Plaintiff filed a Default Judgment against Defendant. See 
Default Judgment. 
19. It was the understanding of the Defendant's Nevada counsel that the parties were 
continuing settlement negotiations between June 16, 2006 and August 11, 2006. See Affidavit of 
Tisha Black Chernine, f^ 15. 
20. Despite his assurance made on June 16,2006, Mr. Utley did not notify Defendant's 
counsel before filing the Default Judgment. See Affidavit ofTisha Black Chernine, f 17. 
21. Defendant was first notified of the underlying Default Judgment when Defendant's 
Nevada counsel received a copy of the Notice of Entry of Default Judgment on August 17, 2006. 
See Affidavit ofTisha Black Chernine, f 18. 
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22. Immediately after Defendant's Nevada counsel received the Notice of Entry of 
Default Judgment, the law offices of Gallian, Wilcox, Welker & Olson, L.C. were contacted and 
immediately thereafter employed as resident counsel for Defendant. See Affidavit ofTisha Black 
Chernine, f^ 19. 
in . LEGAL ARGUMENT 
A. A Default Judgment Should be Set Aside Where There has been a Mistake, 
Surprise, Excusable Neglect, Misrepresentation, Fraud or Any Other Reason 
Justifying Relief. 
Relief from a judgment is governed by Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
URCP 60(b)(1) provides that a party can be relieved from an underlying judgment or order when 
there has been "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." Similarly, URCP 
60(b)(3) allows an order to be set aside in the event of "fraud" or "misrepresentation." As a 
catch-all, URCP 60(b)(6) permits the abatement of an order for "any other reason justifying 
relief from the operation of the judgment." As will be discussed more below, Defendant is 
entitled to relief from the underlying Default Judgment based on all three theories. 
B. It Would Be An Abuse Of Discretion To Refuse To Vacate A Default Judgment 
Where There Is "Reasonable Justification" For A Party's Delayed Appearance. 
When considering a Rule 60(b) Motion, trial courts are given broad discretion; however, 
in Utah, it is uniformly regarded as an abuse of discretion to refuse to vacate a default judgment 
where there is "reasonable justification or excuse for the defendant's failure to appear, and timely 
application is made to set it aside." Lund v. Brown, 11 P.3d 277, 280 (Utah 2000). The 
Supreme Court of Utah has had the opportunity to weigh the conflicting public policy arguments 
surrounding a trial court's decision regarding whether to vacate a default judgment. In 
Westinghouse. the Court opined as follows: 
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It is indeed commendable to handle cases with dispatch and to move 
calendars with expedition in order to keep them up to date. But it is even 
more important to keep in mind that the very reason for the existence of 
courts is to afford disputants an opportunity to be heard and to do justice 
between them. In conformity with that principle the courts generally tend 
to favor granting relief from default judgments where there is any 
reasonable excuse, unless it will result in substantial prejudice or 
injustice to the adverse party. 
Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 
1975) (emphasis added). Thus, without a finding of substantial prejudice or injustice to Plaintiff, 
this Court should grant Defendant' motion for rehef Furthermore, according to the supreme 
court, it is a well-settled policy in this state that "the courts should be liberal in granting relief 
against judgments taken by default to the end that controversies may be tried on the merits." 
State By and Through Utah State Dept. of Social Services v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053, 1055 
(Utah 1983). In fact, any doubts as to the reasonableness of the excuse should be resolved in 
favor of the movant. See Interstate Excavating, Inc. v. Agla Dev. Corp., 636 P.2d 369, 370-71 
(Utah 1980). Thus, upon a finding that there is a "reasonable justification" for Defendant's 
delayed appearance, this court should vacate the August 11, 2006 Default Judgment. 
C. There Are Several Reasonable Justifications For Defendant's Delayed 
Appearance. 
1. The Discharge Of Attorney Aileen Cohen Resulted In Mistake, Excusable 
Neglect And Surprise. 
Pursuant to URCP 60(b)(1), a party can be relieved from an underlying judgment or order when 
there has been "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." In Locke v. Peterson, 285 P.2d 
1111 (Utah 1955), the supreme court granted relief to a defaulting party because the summons served oi 
the defendant reasonably caused the defendant to become confused as to whether he needed to file an 
answer. In Lund, the Supreme Court again found adequate grounds to grant relief to a defaulting party 
where that party was under a good faith but erroneous belief that no action on a counterclaim seeking 
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declaratory relief could be taken against him because of his previous fihng of a bankruptcy petition. 11 
P.3d at 281. In Interstate Excavating, relief was granted upon the defendant's contention that, following 
the withdrawal of its attorney, the defendant never saw the plaintiffs notice to appear or appoint counsel 
or the notice of the trial that the defendant failed to attend. 611 P.2d at 370-71. 
The reasoning of Lund and Interstate Excavating apply in this case. At all times, 
Defendant exercised due diligence in resolving its disputes with Plaintiff, but the default 
occurred, in part, due to the confusion and lapse of response caused by the discharge of Attorney 
Aileen Cohen from her employment at Black LoBello & Sparks. After her discharge on or 
around June 30, 2006, Ms. Cohen's pending assignments were inadvertently reassigned and 
communications regarding her cases were forwarded to other attorneys who were less familiar 
with the matters. At around that time, the other attorneys at Black LoBello & Sparks, 
specifically Tisha Black and Josh Correlli, were under the impression that settlement 
negotiations were continuing in this case. In fact, the Defendant forwarded an email to the 
Plaintiff on July 25, 2006 requesting another settlement conference. 
From the above facts it is clear that a series of miscommunications and misunderstanding 
between the parties and their respected counsel occurred due to Ms. Aileen Cohen's discharge. 
Accordingly, the Defendant's requested relief should be granted because of the mistakes and 
excusable neglect of the Defendant and its Nevada counsel. 
Furthermore, because of Mr. Utley's prior assurances that he would not file a Default 
Judgment with first notifying Defendant's Nevada counsel (as i$ the practice in Nevada), the 
remaining attorneys at Black LoBello & Sparks and the Defendant did not realize that a Default 
Judgment was imminent. Mr. Utley's failure to provide notice, as promised, resulted in a 
surprise to Defendant which warrants relief under Rule 60(b). 
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2. Plaintiffs Counsel Failure To Notify Defendant's Nevada Counsel Before 
Filing The Default Judgment, Despite His Prior Assurances, Constituted 
Misrepresentation. 
Rule 60(b)(3) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows the Court to set aside a 
judgment based on misrepresentation or fraud. The body of relevant case law discusses jfraud. 
Defendant does not allege that fraudulent statements were made in this case. However, the 
arguments and rationale for misrepresentation are equivalent. The Utah Supreme Court has 
ruled that a trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow a wife a hearing on her motion to 
set aside a divorce decree on fraud where it appeared that the husband had acted fraudulently by 
substantially understating his assets. Boyce v. Boyce, 609 P.2d 928 (Utah 1980). The trial 
court's refusal to grant the wife's Rule 60(b) motion denied her "a judgment based on accurate 
information and full disclosure relative to the merits of her position." Id. at 931. 
The Boyce rationale applies here to Mr. Utley's representation to Defendant's counsel. 
On or around June 16, 2006, Mr. Utley represented to Defendant's Nevada counsel during a 
conference call that Plaintiff would not file a default without first providing notice. Defendant 
does not allege that Mr. Utley was fraudulent in his communications with Defendant's Nevada 
counsel. However, because it is the common practice in Nevada that notice be given before a 
default is filed, Defendant relied on Mr. Utley's assurances and engaged in the settlement 
negotiation without having first filed a responsive pleading. 
To Defendant's detriment, on August 11, 2006, a Default Judgment was filed without 
prior notice. Had notice been provided before hand, Defendant would have filed a responsive 
pleading and avoided the underlying Default Judgment. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 60(b)(3), 
Defendant's request relief should be granted. 
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3. The Totality Of The Circumstances Warrant An Equitable Vacating Of The 
Default Judgment, 
URCP 60(b)(6) permits the setting aside of a judgment for "any other reason justifying 
relief from the operation of the judgment" Rule 60(b)(6) applies where it is just to grant relief, 
but none of the other provision of Rule 60(b) apply. See Richins v. Delbert Chinman & Sons, 
817 P.2d 382 (Utah App. 1991). Even if Ms. Aileen Cohen's discharge and or Mr. Utley's 
misrepresentation alone do not warrant a setting aside of the Default Judgment, the collective 
events and injustice surrounding these facts justify relief, in this case there are several 
extenuating circumstances that warrant equitable relief An alleged twenty-one (21) day delay in 
the final payment has resulted in a Late Payment Penalty of One Hundred Five Hundred 
Thousand dollars ($150,000.00). Defendant refutes the Late Payment Penalty because of an 
alleged extension of the due date and unconscionability. Now, after the dispute has resulted in a 
lawsuit, Defendant is again harmed by another alleged misrepresentation as the Plaintiff has filed 
a Default Judgment without providing prior notice as promised. 
Without even reviewing the merits of the case and defense, a cursory review of the facts 
reveal that the Default Judgment is extremely harsh. Accordingly, Rule 60(b)(6) applies and 
warrants relief to avoid a harsh and unjust result. 
D. Defendant's Motion Should Be Granted As It Presented Reasonable 
Justification, Was Timely Filed, And Is Supported By Meritorious Defenses. 
Defendant has met of all the prerequisites of a Rule 60(b) Motion as the instant motion 
I 
demonstrates a reasonable justification, was timely filed, and presents Defendant's meritorious 
defenses. A Rule 60(b) motion based on subparts (1) or (3) must be made within a reasonable 
time, not more than three months after the subject judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or 
taken. URCP 60(b). Furthermore, although a movant need not actually prove its proposed 
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defenses, the party must show a meritorious defense so as to prevent the necessity of judicial 
review of questions which, on the face of the pleadings, are frivolous. Lund, 11 P.3d at 280. 
Here, as the underlying default judgment was filed on August 11, 2006, Defendant's Rule 
60(b) Motion was timely. Regarding Defendant's meritorious defenses, as mentioned above, 
Defendant challenges the enforceability of the Late Payment Penalty provisions, alleges that the 
final payment was timely made on the modified due date, and that Plaintiff waived any claim for 
Late Payment Penalty by granting an extension for the final payment. (Please also see the 
Defendant's proposed Answer and Affirmative Defenses attached hereto as "Exhibit B".) 
Accordingly, Defendant's instant motion satisfies all of the prerequisites of a Rule 60(b) Motion 
for Relief from Judgment or Order and should, therefore, be granted. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
There are three independent theories under Rule 60(b) to support this Court's decision to 
set aside the August 11, 2006 Default Judgment. The lapse of communication and response to 
the subject matter caused by the discharge of Ms. Cohen resulted in excusable neglect, mistake 
and surprise. Mr. Utley's failure to provide prior notice regarding the Plaintiffs intent to file a 
default was a misrepresentation and or fraud. Lastly, equity and justice warrant the requested 
relief. Accordingly, based on the foregoing, Defendant respectfully requests that its Motion for 
Relief from the Default Judgment be granted. 
DATED this *& day of S ^ ^ ^ S 2006. 
W2F 
GALLIAN, WESTFALL, WILCOX & WELKER 
Attorney for Defendant 
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MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT'S RULE 60(b) MOTION 
FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT AND 
ORDERS 
HEARING REQUESTED 
Civil No. 060500096 
Judge Eric A. Ludlow 
Plaintiff, Arbogast Family Trust, TJ Ventures, LLC, by and through its attorney of record, 
Chad J. Utley of Farris & Utley, PC, hereby files the following Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant's Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief From Judgment and Orders. 
HEARING REQUESTED 
Plaintiff hereby requests that Defendant's Motion be heartd at a hearing before this court. 
It is estimated that argument would be 1-2 hours in length. 
i 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. That Plaintiff Rodney Arbogast is the Co-Trustee of the Arbograst Family Trust 
(hereinafter sometimes referred to as "Plaintiff) of which he is authorized to represent in 
these proceedings and who is a resident of Washington County, State of Utah. 
2. That Defendant Rivercrossings, LLC, (hereinafter "Defendant") is a Nevada limited 
liability company licensed and authorized to conduct business in the State of Utah. 
3. That Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a contract in Washington County, State of Utah. 
4. That on or about the 16th day of September, 2004, the Plaintiff provided Defendant with a 
loan in the amount of Two Million Four Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($2,450,000.00) 
(hereinafter "Loan"). 
5. That said Loan was secured by a Trust Deed Note that is dated the 16th day of September, 
2004. This Trust Deed Note was signed by Michael Chernine on behalf of the 
Defendant. The signed Trust Deed Note provided a schedule of payments as follows: The 
sum of $18,375.00 monthly, interest only, beginning on October 16, 2004, and the like 
sum of $18,375.00, monthly, on the 16th day of each and every month thereafter, until the 
16th day of September, 2005, when the entire remaining unpaid principal balance, together 
with interest accrued thereon, shall become immediately due and payable. (See copy of 
Trust Deed Note attached hereto as "Exhibit A"). 
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6. That on or about the 16th day of September, 2005, when the remaining unpaid principal 
balance together with interest accrued thereon became d\}e, Defendant was unable and/or 
failed to tender this last and final payment. 
7. That not until the 7th day of October, 2005, twenty-one (21) days after the final payment 
was due, did Defendant pay the Plaintiff what Defendant claimed to be the final 
remaining balance due under the Loan. 
8. That the Trust Deed Note signed on the 16th day of September, 2004, provided in its terms 
a penalty for late payments (hereinafter "Late Payment Penalty") as follows: "A late 
payment penalty of Six percent (6.0%) if any payment due shall be assessed against the 
maker if said payment has not been received by Holder (Plaintiffs) within Five (5) days of 
the due date. Each payment shall be credited first to any late payments due, then to 
accrued interest due and the remainder to principal. Any such installment not paid when 
due shall bear the interest thereafter at the rate of Twelve percent (12.0%) per annum 
until paid." (See copy of Trust Deed Note attached hereto as "Exhibit A"). 
9. That Defendant has since refused to comply with the Late Payment Penalty term in the 
Trust Deed Note. That as a result of Defendant's dispute over the Late Payment Penalty 
clause, on or about October 6, 2005, Defendant authorised Southern Utah Title Company 
to withhold One Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand Five Hundred Thirty Nine and 31/100 
Dollars ($178,539.31) (hereinafter "Escrowed Funds") and to hold said amount in escrow 
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pending the resolution of the dispute. (See copy of Escrow Instructions/Holdback 
Agreement attached hereto as "Exhibit B"). 
10. That in addition to the Escrowed Funds, the Escrow Instructions/Holdback Agreement 
included the provision that in the event the Borrower (Defendant) and the Beneficiary 
(Plaintiff) could not agree in writing as to the disposition of the funds placed into escrow, 
Southern Utah Title Company would disburse the funds in accordance with a court order. 
(See copy of Escrow Instructions/Holdback Agreement attached hereto as "Exhibit B"). 
11. That Plaintiff made several attempts to reach an agreement with Defendant concerning 
the correct interpretation of the late payment penalty clause and has heard no response in 
regards to these attempts for resolution. 
12. That on or about January 10, 2006, after several unsuccessful attempts to reach an 
agreement with Defendant, Plaintiff filed a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment in this 
Court. (See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, on record; see also Affidavit of Chad J. 
Utley at \ 3). 
13. That on or about December 20, 2005, Plaintiffs counsel received a letter from Josh 
Corelli, on behalf of Tisha Black-Chernine, informing Plaintiff that Defendant had 
retained the legal services of Black, Lobello & Pitegoff. (See copy of Josh Corelli Letter 
attached hereto as "Exhibit C;" see also Affidavit of Chad J. Utley at \ 4). 
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14. That Plaintiffs counsel granted Defendant's Nevada counsel, Aileen E. Cohen of Black, 
Lobello & Pitegoff, two extensions of time in which to respond to the Complaint for 
Declaratory Judgment, to make a settlement offer and/or to seek Utah counsel. (See copy 
of Aileen E. Cohen Letters attached hereto as "Exhibit D;" see also Affidavit of Chad J. 
Utley at \ 5). 
15. That telephone calls and/or facsimile transmission was the typical method of 
communication between the parties5 counsel. (See copy of Aileen E. Cohen Letters 
attached hereto as "Exhibit D;" see also Affidavit of Chad J. Utley at ^ 6). 
16. That the second of the two time extensions granted to Defendant expired on June 14, 
2006. (See Affidavit of 'Chad1 Utley at \ 7). 
17. That on or about June 28, 2006, Plaintiffs counsel received a verbal offer of settlement 
from Defendant's counsel Josh Correlli in the amount o(f $10,000.00. (See Affidavit of 
Chad J. Utley at \ 8). 
18. That on or about June 29, 2006, Plaintiffs counsel sent a letter via facsimile transmission 
to Defendant's counsel, Tisha Black-Chernine, informing her that Plaintiff had rejected 
the verbal settlement offer and was requiring Defendant to file an Answer to the 
Complaint within twenty (20) days. (See copy of Chad, J. Utley Letter attached hereto as 
"Exhibit E;" see also Affidavit of Chad J. Utley at % 9)\ 
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19. That contrary to Defendant's Nevada counsel's allegations, Plaintiffs counsel did not 
grant an additional extension of time beyond June 14, 2006 to Defendant's Nevada 
counsel in which to respond to the Complaint. (See Affidavit of Chad J. Utley at \ 10). 
20. That on or about July 31, 2006, well after the twenty (20) days had expired, Plaintiff filed 
a Certificate of Default with this Court. (See copy ofCertificate of Default, on record; 
see also Affidavit of Chad I Utley at f 77). 
21. That on or about August 11, 2006, Plaintiff filed a Default Judgment against Defendant. 
(See copy of Default Judgment, on record; see also Affidavit of Chad J. Utley at Tf 72). 
22. That on or about August 17, 2006, Plaintiff sent to Defendant a Notice of Entry of 
Default Judgment. (See copy ofNotice of Entry of Default Judgment, on record). 
23. That Plaintiff did not receive any communication from Defendant's Nevada counsel from 
the time of the June 28,2006 teleconference until an August 18,2006 telephone call from 
Tisha Black-Chernine. (See Affidavit of Chad J Utley at \ 75). 
24. That on or about August 18, 2006, Plaintiffs counsel was informed by Ms. Black-
Chernine that she was unaware of the June 29, 2006 letter because she had not been in the 
office for an extended period of time. (See Affidavit of Chad J. Utley at % 14), 
25. That on or about September 27, 2006, Plaintiff received Defendant's Rule 60(b) Motion 
for Relief From Judgment and Orders with an accompanying proposed Answer. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. Defendants' Neglect was Not Excusable Under Rule 60(b). 
In the case before us, the first issue is whether Defendant's actions constitute such 
"excusable neglect" so as to justify this Court in setting aside the Default Judgment. Following 
Utah statutory and case law, Defendant's actions do not rise to the level of such "excusable 
neglect" as to justify granting Defendant's Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief From Judgment and 
Orders. 
Under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b)(1), the "court may in the furtherance of 
justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for 
the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect..." (URCP 
60(b)(1). Before a court sets aside a judgment on the grounds of "excusable neglect," it must 
first determine the meaning and weigh the relevant factors of "excusable neglect." 
Although there is ample case law restating the rule which sets forth the standards required 
to set aside a default judgment, there is very little case law actually defining those standards. 
Although Defendants use the term "reasonable justification" in lieu of "excusable neglect," the 
two terms are synonymous. The Utah Supreme Court attempted to define "excusable neglect" by 
stating, "[w]e have heretofore defined 'excusable neglect' as the exercise of 'due diligence' by a 
reasonably prudent person under similar circumstances." Mini Spas, Inc. v. Industrial 
Commission. 733 P.2d 130, 132 (Utah 1987). 
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Defendants have cited the case of Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen 
Contractor, Inc.. 544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975) implying it would be sound policy to simply set aside 
this Default Judgment because of the excuses offered and that to do so would satisfy justice and 
due process. However, as the Westinghouse court made clear, "...the courts generally tend to 
favor granting relief from default judgments where there is any reasonable excuse, unless it will 
result in substantial prejudice or injustice to the adverse party." Id at 879. (Emphasis added) 
Because Defendant seeks to set this Default Judgment aside on the basis of "excusable neglect" 
or "reasonable justification" and allege that their actions fall within said standard, it therefore 
seems necessary to define "due diligence" and how it relates to "excusable neglect" 
A. Defendants' actions do not fall within the definition of "due diligence." 
Defendant states in his memorandum, "At all times, Defendant exercised due diligence in 
resolving its dispute with Plaintiff, but the default occurred, in part, due to confusion and lapse of 
response caused by the discharge of Attorney Aileen Cohen from her employment at Black, 
LoBello & Sparks." (See copy of Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
Defendant's Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief From Judgment and Orders). However, it was 
Defendant's Nevada counsels' lack of due diligence that led to their failure to respond to 
Plaintiffs Complaint for Declaratory Judgment within the allotted time. (See copy ofChad 1 
Utley Letter attached hereto as "Exhibit E"). Such negligence and lack of due diligence does not 
fall within the contemplated parameters of "excusable neglect." 
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In Black's Title Inc. v. State Ins. Dept, 991 P.2d 607 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) the court 
clarified the meaning of due diligence by saying, "to demonstrate that the default was due to 
excusable neglect, 'the movant must show that he has used due diligence and that he was 
prevented from appearing by circumstances over which he had np control.'" Quoting Airkem 
Intel-mountain, Inc v. Parker. 513 P.2d 429, 431 (Utah 1973) (Erhphasis added). Thus, pursuant 
to the language used by the Blacks' court, Defendant's Nevada counsel here may only allege 
"excusable neglect" after a showing of due diligence, or in other words, only after showing that 
for reasons beyond their control, they were unable or "prevented" from filing a timely response. 
Id. 
In this case, Defendant's attorney's assert in the memorandum that the discharge of 
Attorney Aileen Cohen, the ensuing confusion and the reassignment of cases led to, "in part" 
Defendant's failure to timely respond; of which Defendant claims is sufficient confusion as to 
amount to "excusable neglect." Although a discharge of employment is regretful, said discharge 
did not result in type of confusion now plead. Defendant alleges the confusion resulted from a 
discharge date of June 30, 2006. However, it was approximately two (2) weeks prior to this 
discharge date that Plaintiffs attorney, Chad J. Utley, spoke with Attorney Tisha Black-
Chernine. The reassignment of this case from Aileen Cohen to,Tisha Black-Chernine had taken 
place well before Plaintiff's letter requesting the Complaint be answered. Any resulting 
confusion wras not a result of mis-communication or misunderstandings, but a lack of due 
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diligence. 
In the case of Prowswood. Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 676 P.2d 952 (Utah 1984) 
the court referenced a similar case. In Maryland Casualty Company v. Conner, 382 F.2d 13,16 
(10th Cir.1967) counsel missed an appeal deadline and sought an extension to file the same. As 
an excuse, counsel said, "he had inherited as a result of his partner's death, indicating that 
through inadvertence and preoccupation with other matters, he neglected to file the notice within 
the statutory period." The court held that the "involvement in other matters did not show 
excusable neglect within the meaning of the rule." Id. Although, the Prowswood case is dealing 
with appeals under URCP Rule 73(a), which is subject to more strict standard, neither URCP 
Rule 73(a) nor URCP Rule 60(b) considers attorney workload, reassignment of cases or attorney 
confusion as "due diligence" and/or "excusable neglect." 
B. Defendant should not be provided relief under Rule 60(b)(3) as Plaintiffs counsel 
provided Defendant's Nevada counsel with notice prior to filing the Default 
Judgment. 
Defendant further attempts to excuse Defendant's Nevada counsel's lack of due diligence 
by trying to convince this Court that Plaintiffs counsel is responsible for the failure of 
Defendant's Nevada counsel to file a timely response. Defendant states in the memorandum, 
Furthermore, because of Mr.Utley's prior assurances that he would not file 
a Default Judgment without first notifying Defendant's Nevada counsel (as 
is the practice in Nevada), the remaining attorneys at Black LoBello & 
Sparks and the Defendant did not realize that a Default Judgment was 
imminent. 
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(See Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Rule 60(b) Motion to For 
Relief From Judgment and Orders atpg. 7). 
Contrary to Defendant's assertions, Plaintiffs counsel diji provide Defendant's Nevada 
counsel with prior notice. In a letter dated June 29, 2006 and sent at approximately 4:30 pm 
Mountain Standard Time on June 29, 2006, Plaintiffs counsel Chad J. Utley informed 
Defendant's Nevada counsel Tisha Black-Chernine and John Corelli, 
My client has previously granted your client an extension of time within 
which to answer the complaint. However, given the present state of the 
case, I am, on behalf of my client, hereby requesting that your client file an 
Answer to the complaint within twenty (20) days of the date of this letter. 
(See copy of Chad J. Utley Letter attached hereto as "Exhibit E']). 
As mentioned, Plaintiffs counsel did speak with Defendant's Nevada counsel, Tisha 
Black-Chernine, wherein she was informed that she would be provided with notice. In 
accordance with Mr. Utley's promise, Defendant was provided with notice on June 30, 2006, that 
extensions were expired and that it was now time to file a respotisive pleading. Mr. Utley can 
not be held responsible for Defendant's Nevada counsels' negligence and failure to exercise due 
diligence. As held in Black's, "because this neglect was caused by Black's failure to exercise 
due diligence, it was not to be excused." And so it is here; Defendant should not be excused 
from judgment on account of attorney neglect and failure to exercise due diligence and should 
certainly not be excused by shamelessly pointing the finger of blame towards Plaintiffs counsel. 
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C. Rule 60(b)(6) does not apply to the relief sought here as Defendant is seeking 
relief under Rule 60(b)(1). 
Following the arguments set forth above, little attention should be given to Defendant's 
argument to set aside the default judgment under Rule 60(b)(6), which provides relief based on 
"any other reason justifying relief from the operation of judgment." In Black's Title Inc., the 
court also held, "subsection (6) may not be employed for relief when the grounds asserted are 
encompassed within subsection (1)." Black's Title Inc. at 612 quoting Lincoln Benefit Life Ins. 
Co v. D.T. Southern Properties. 838 P. 2d 672, 674 (Utah App. 1992). As Plaintiff has already 
argued and Defendants have failed to present, there is no legitimate, reasonable, good faith 
excuse that would justify the granting of setting aside the default judgment. 
In the event the Court were to look to Rule 60(b)(6) to determine whether "any other 
reason justifying relief exists, Plaintiff respectfully submits that there no other reasons why the 
relief sought should be granted. As argued above, Defendant's Nevada counsel's confusion and 
failure to timely respond is the result of failing to exercise due diligence. Furthermore, contrary 
to Defendant's argument, Defendant did have reason to believe that default was imminent as 
PlaintifFs counsel did in fact provide prior notice to Defendant's Nevada counsel that a response 
was due within twenty (20) days. What is more, Defendant alleges that because meritorious 
defenses may exist, the same should result in a free pass. Plaintiff respectfully suggests 
otherwise and submits that a cursory review of the facts reveal inattentiveness that would not 
justify relief under Rule 60(b)(6). 
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II. Defendant's meritorious defenses should not be considered as Defendant has 
failed to show excusable neglect or provide any other reason justifying relief. 
As Defendant has also referenced, the court in State v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053 (Utah 
1983) held, "In order for defendant to be relieved from the default judgment, he must not only 
show that the judgment was entered against him through excusable neglect (or any other reason 
specified in Rule 60, but he must also show that his motion to set aside the judgment was timely, 
and that he has a meritorious defense to the action." IcL at 1056. Plaintiff does not dispute the 
timeliness of Defendant's Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief From Judgment and Orders, however, 
Plaintiff does assert that although Defendant alleges meritorious defenses, such defenses are 
immaterial to this Court's determination of ruling on Defendant's Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief 
From Judgment and Orders. 
In Musselman. the court went on to quote, "This latter question [of meritorious defense] 
arises only after consideration of the first question [of excusable neglect] and a sufficient excuse 
therefrom being shown.'" Id at 1056. Quoting Board of Education of Granite School District v. 
Cox. 384 P.2d 806 (Utah 1963). In reference to how the courts consider meritorious defenses, 
the Musselman court went on to say, 
We find merit in defendant's position. This Court's statement in the Cox 
decision clearly sets forth the policy in this jurisdiction requiring that the 
lower court consider and resolve the question of Excusable neglect (when 
the motion to vacate the default judgment is based on excusable neglect) 
prior to its consideration of the issue of whether a meritorious defense 
exists. Furthermore, in accordance with this policy, it is unnecessary, and 
moreover inappropriate, to even consider the issue of meritorious defenses 
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unless the court is satisfied that a sufficient excuse has been shown. 
Id at 1056. (Emphasis added). 
In this case, Defendant is indeed basing Defendant's Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief From 
Judgment and Orders, in part, on "excusable neglect." It is for this reason that Plaintiff 
respectfully suggests that Defendant has failed to show that Defendant's Nevada counsel 
exercised due diligence and/or has failed to provide this Court with a sufficient excuse that 
would amount to "excusable neglect" or "any other reason justifying relief." Plaintiff further 
submits that pursuant to Musselman, this Court must first determine whether Defendant's 
inaction amounts to excusable neglect. To do so otherwise, it would be "inappropriate to even 
consider the issue of meritorious defenses..." Id. 
14 
CONCLUSION 
Pursuant to the arguments set forth above, Plaintiff respectfully requests that Defendant's 
Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief From Judgment and Orders be denied and that Plaintiff be awarded 
costs and fees incurred in responding to the same. 
DATED this (J day of October, 2006. 
FARRIS & UTLEY, P.C. 
By:. 
TYliEKJP. TODD 
Attorney for Plaintiiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILIN(p 
}?ih~ I hereby certify that on this / j day of October, 2006,1 caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing to be mailed, US Mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Mr. Jeffrey C. Wilcox 
Gallian, Wilcox Welker & Olson 
59 South 100 East 
St. George, UT 84770 ^ 
*S'An Empljoyee of FARRIS & UTLEY, PC/ 
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GALLIAN, WILCOX, WELKER & OLSON, L.C. 
Jeffrey C Wilcox, #4441 
59 South 100 East 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Telephone: (435) 628-1682 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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JN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT, WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ARBOGAST FAMILY TRUST, by and 
Through RODNEY J. ARBOGAST as 
TRUSTEE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RIVER CROSSINGS, LLC, a Nevada 
Limited Liability Company, 
Defendant. 
REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S 
RULE 60(b) MOTION FOR 
RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT AND 
ORDERS 
Civil No.: 060500096 
Judge: Eric A. Ludlow 
Defendant River Crossings, LLC, by and through Jeffrey C. Wilcox of the law office of 
GALLIAN, WILCOX, WELKER & OLSON, hereby submits this Reply to Plaintiffs 
Opposition to Defendant's Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from Judgment and Orders. 
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
I. ADDITIONAL FACTS 
The facts in this matter have been discussed in length in preceding pleadings. 
Accordingly, only the facts relevant to this Reply are discussed herein. 
As stated in Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendant's Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from 
Judgment and Orders, the second extension to Answer Plaintiffs Complaint granted by 
Plaintiffs counsel, Chad J. Utley, expired on June 14, 2006. Moreover, on June 16, 2006, Josh 
Correlli, of Defendant's Nevada counsel's office, Black, LoBello & Sparks (hereinafter "BLS") 
telephoned Mr. Utley to discuss the status of settlement negotiations, wherein, as Plaintiff has 
correctly plead, Mr. Correlli communicated an offer to settle this matter for $10,000.00. 
However, Plaintiff fails to recognize that portion of the telephone conference, wherein Mr. Utley 
agreed with Mr. Correlli's contention that it was reasonably uncertain whether the penalty 
provisions contained in that certain Trust Deed Note ("Note"), dated September 16, 2004, would 
be enforceable. Additionally, Plaintiff fails to recognize that Mr. Correlli expressed concern 
with regard to the fact that the most recent extension to file an answer had expired on June 14, 
2006, and at that point, Mr. Utley expressly stated that he would not pursue a default judgment 
without first notifying BLS. 
Thereafter, on approximately June 29, 2006, the office of BLS received facsimile 
correspondence from Mr. Utley, wherein he requested that Defendant file an answer to Plaintiffs 
Complaint within twenty days thereof. However, despite Mr. Utley's "request" that an answer 
be filed within twenty days of June 29, 2006, he had previously represented to Mr. Correlli that 
he would not file a default judgment until notifying BLS of the same. 
At the time of Mr. Utley's June 29, 2006 correspondence, which was addressed to Tisha 
Black-Chernine, of BLS, Mrs. Black-Chernine was on vacation. Accordingly, she was not made 
aware of Mr. Utley's new extension deadline to answer the complaint. Moreover, in interpreting 
Mr. Utley's most recent oral communication along with his correspondence, it was BLS' 
understanding that while Mr. Utley was requesting that Defendant file its answer within twenty 
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days of June 29, 2006, BLS still understood that Mr. Utley would not pursue a default judgment 
until first notifying BLS. Accordingly, BLS relied on Mr. Utley is oral representation that he 
would first notify BLS before filing a default. 
Finally, due to the fact that BLS had not heard from Mr. Utley and Defendant had not 
heard from Plaintiff in almost a month, on July 25, 2006, Defendant's Managing Member, Mike 
Chernine, emailed Plaintiff and requested that Plaintiff call Mr. Chernine in order to discuss the 
possible settlement of the subject action. See Exhibit "A." Plaintiff failed to respond to Mr. 
Chernine5 s email by any form of communication. Furthermore, Without having the common 
courtesy to respond to Mr. Chernine5 s email to inform Mr. Chenpine of Plaintiff s intent to enter 
a default judgment, six (6) days later, Plaintiff filed a Certificate of Default with this Court, and 
Mr. Utley failed to forward such Certificate to Mr. Chernine or BLS. 
Even after filing the Certificate of Default, Plaintiff refused to acknowledge Mr. 
Chernine5s good faith effort to negotiate a settlement without this Court's intervention. 
Apparently, Plaintiff felt that Mr. Chernine was not entitled to the common courtesy of a 
response, which would have taken thirty (30) seconds out of Plaintiff s day. In fact, it is 
Defendant's belief that Plaintiff was actually avoiding Defendaiit with the hope that Defendant 
would not be made aware of Plaintiff s Certificate of Default in order to ensure that Plaintiffs 
Default Judgment would be granted. 
Plaintiffs deceitful behavior with regard to both his litigation practices and his practices 
related to the Note should not be rewarded by this Court. More importantly, Defendant should 
not be deprived of its opportunity to contest Plaintiffs outrageous and unconscionable demand 
for the penalty provision contained in the Note, especially wheq considering the fact that 
Plaintiff actually orally granted Defendant an extension to pay the total balance on the Note. 
3 
II. ARGUMENT 
As this Court is aware, "the law disfavors default judgments," and a decision to set aside 
a default judgment is within the discretion of the trial court. Black's Title, Inc. v. Utah State 
Insurance Department, 991 P.2d 607, 610 (Utah 1999) (additional citation omitted). In 
deteimining the question of whether to grant relief from a default judgment, the court shall work 
to the furtherance of justice and the protection of the rights of all concerned. See Jolly v. 
Haycock, 32 Utah 366, 90 P.901 (1907). Where the prevailing party would not suffer 
inconvenience or loss by vacating a default judgment, the court may so vacate. Id. 
"Where there is doubt about whether a default should be set aside, that doubt should be 
resolved in favor of doing so." Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 93 (1986). Moreover, "[t]he court 
should be generally indulgent toward setting a judgment aside where there is reasonable 
justification or excuse for the defendant's failure to answer and when timely application is 
made," IcL Finally, as Plaintiff has acknowledged, "the courts generally tend to favor granting 
relief from default judgments where there is any reasonable excuse, unless it will result in 
substantial prejudice or injustice to the adverse party." See Plaintiffs Opposition at page 8, 
quoting Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876, 879 
(Utah 1975) (emphasis added). 
In order to be relieved from the default, Defendant must show that its motion to set aside 
was timely, that it has a meritorious defense, and that the default occurred for a reason specified 
in Rule 60(b). Black's Title, Inc. at 610. Plaintiff has not disputed the timeliness of Defendant's 
Motion. Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to present any argument that Defendant lacks meritorious 
defenses. Accordingly, the only issue before this Court is whether this Court should grant relief 
from the default judgment, which, as set forth more fully below, is warranted due to the fact that 
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Defendant has set forth a "reasonable excuse," and such relief will not substantially "prejudice or 
injustice the adverse party." See Westinehouse Elec. Supply Co,, at 879, 
I. Pursuant to URCP 60(b), Defendant's neglect was excusable due to Mr. 
Utley's inconsistent representations and Plaintiffs deceitful behavior. 
Despite Plaintiffs Opposition, Defendant's excusable neglect warrants relief from 
judgment. As Plaintiff has properly stated, the Utah Supreme C<burt has "defined 'excusable 
neglect' as the exercise of 'due diligence' by a reasonably prudeiit person under similar 
circumstances." Mini Spas. Inc. v. Industrial Commission, 733 P.2d 130, 132 (Utah 1987). 
A plaintiffs failure to furnish notice of default judgment proceedings provides additional 
justification for granting relief from such default judgment. Luqd v. Brown, 11 P.3d 277, 281 
(2000). Moreover, where there is a good faith, legitimate belief that no default would be taken 
against a defendant, the "reasonable justification or excuse" standard is satisfied. Id. 
Here, Defendant's neglect was the proximate result of inconsistent communications by 
Mr. Utley and Plaintiffs refusal to extend common courtesy to Mr. Chernine by informing Mr. 
Chernine of Plaintiff s intent to move for default. Accordingly,) relief from judgment is not only 
warranted, justice requires it. 
Plaintiff relies heavily upon the above-cited case, Black's Title, Inc. v. Utah State 
Insurance Dept. to support his contention that Defendant has failed to show due diligence. 
However, Plaintiff failed to acknowledge the fact that on July 25, 2006, just six (6) days before 
Plaintiff filed his Certificate of Default, Mr. Chernine forwarded email correspondence to 
Plaintiff to "discuss the direction of [Plaintiffs] lawsuit." In Black's, the non-moving party had 
neglected to maintain contact with the moving-party, and accordingly, the Court upheld the 
previous decision to deny relief from the default judgment. As stated above, six (6) days before 
Plaintiff filed his Certificate of Default, Mr. Chernine contacted Plaintiff assuming; that there 
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remained an opportunity for the parties to come to an amicable resolution. However, Plaintiff 
refused to acknowledge Mr. Chernine's good faith efforts. Accordingly, the instant matter is 
distinguishable from Black's in the sense that Mr. Chernine continued to maintain contact with 
Plaintiff. 
Additionally, Plaintiffs reliance on Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 676 
P.2d 952 (Utah 1984) is completely misplaced. Page 10 of Plaintiff s Opposition states that: "As 
an excuse, counsel said, 'he had inherited as a result of his partner's death, indicating that 
through inadvertence and preoccupation with other matters, he neglected to file the notice within 
the statutory period.' The court held that the 'involvement in other matters did not show 
excusable neglect within the meaning of the rule.'" Quoting Prowswood at 960, citing Maryland 
Casualty Company v. Conner, 382 F.2d 13, 16-17 (10th Cir.1967) (emphasis added). 
However, the above-cited case law is entirely inapplicable. Although Plaintiff 
acknowledged that Prowswood "is subject to more strict standard [sic]" (Plaintiffs Opposition 
page 10), he fails to recognize that the Prowswood standard is actually completely inapplicable. 
The Prowswood Court stated that: "When the question of 'excusable neglect' arises in a 
jurisdictional context (e.g., Utah R.Civ.P. 73(a)), as opposed to a nonjurisdictional context 
(e.g.? Utah R.Civ.P. 60(b)), the standard contemplated thereby is necessarily a strict one." 
Prowswood at 959. The Prowswood standard of "excusable neglect" only applies to a 
jurisdictional context and not to a nonjurisdictional context, as in this case. To cite Prowswood 
for a definition and/or standard of "excusable neglect" is entirely misplaced, and accordingly, 
this Court should disregard any arguments based thereon. 
As stated herein above, there are multiple factors present in this matter that satisfy the 
"excusable neglect" standard, pursuant to URCP 60(b). Such factors include, without limitation, 
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(i) the discharge of Ms. Cohen; (ii) the fact that Mr. Utley had orally represented that he would 
not file for default without first notifying BLS; (iii) the fact that Mrs. Black-Chemine was on 
vacation when BLS received Mr. Utley's June 29, 2006 correspondence; (iv) the fact that Mr. 
Chemine attempted to communicate with Plaintiff on July 25, 2006; and (v) the fact that Plaintiff 
failed to extend common courtesy to Mr. Chemine by responding to Mr. Chemine's July 25, 
2006 email and inform him that a default judgment was imminent. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Defendant respectfully requests that this Honorable Court 
grant its Motion for Relief from the Default Judgment. 
DATED this i ^ t t day of /u 'cn^^i^x^2006. 
{
^^L^J^U^ 
/C.W/lcox 
orahd for 
GALLIAN, WESTFALL, WILCOX & WELKER 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing document, postage prepaid on this °A_ day of November, 2006, to the following: 
Chad J. Utley, Esq. 
UTLEY & FARRIS 
189 North Main 
St. George, UT 84770 , ,/)_ (. 
Mmh-
Secretary 
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axrasutley cm est com. 
SHAWN T FARRIS 
CHAD J UTLEY 
TITER T TODD 
COUNSEL 
WESTON J WHITE 
June 29, 2006 Via Fax to 702-869-2669 
Tisha Black-Chernine, Esq 
John Corelli 
Black, LoBello & Pitegoff 
6885 West Charleston Boulevard 
Las Vegas, NV 89117 
Re Rodney Arbogast 
Client No 01710-01 
Dear Ms Black-Chernine 
I have had the opportunity to discuss your client's setdement offer of $10,000 00 in 
this matter, proferred by Mr Corelli of your office My client has advised that he 
does not wish to accept that offer 
My client has previously granted your chent an extension of time within which to 
answer the complaint However, given the present state of the case, I am, on behalf 
of my client, hereby requesting that your client file an Answer to the complaint 
within twenty (20) days of the date of this letter 
Thank you for your assistance in this matter 
Sincerely, 
FAKRXS^C U T L E Y , PC 
